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Abstract
In an electronic election several cryptographic proofs are implemented to guarantee that all the process has
been fair. Many cryptographic primitives are based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm, factorization
and other related problems. However, these problems are e ciently computable with a quantum computer,
and new proofs are needed based on di erent assumptions not broken by quantum computers.
Lattice based cryptography seems one of the most promising post-quantum alternatives. In this thesis
we present a coercion resistant cast as intended proof and a proof of a shu e, both completely based on
lattice problems as Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution (ISIS) and Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE).
With the first we prove to the voter that his vote correctly encodes his voting option, without allowing
him to prove to a third party that he has chosen a specific option, to avoid the possibility of vote selling.
Shu es are permutations and re-encryptions of casted votes performed by mixing network nodes (mix-
net nodes), so that the output can not be related with the input and nobody can link a decrypted vote with
the voter who casted it. Given that the goal is to make the output not linkable to the input it is essential to
provide a proof of it being a correct shu e that has preserved the integrity of the votes, without deleting,
adding of modifying any of them.
To prove both things we have constructed non interactive zero-knowledge proofs, from which anyone
can be convinced that a statement is true (with overwhelming probability over a security parameter) with-
out revealing any information about the elements that witness it being true.
Keywords
cryptographic protocols, e-voting, post-quantum cryptographic protocol, RLWE encryption, coercion resis-
tant cast as intended, proof of a shu e, mix-nets
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1. Introduction
Electronic voting o ers several advantages over traditional elections. It needs less infrastructure, it is less
expensive, it obtains faster the final results, it is more flexible and it considerably simplifies the voting
procedure for electors that are broad at the time of the election. In order to be considered an alternative,
electronic voting needs to be as reliable as a traditional election. To do so it heavily relies on cryptography
to guarantee that anonymity of the voters is preserved while at the same time ensuring that there is no
fraud of any kind. Several cryptographic tools are used to achieve those properties.
Cryptography is a key component of our connected society. From personal communications to online
shopping we want our data, either a personal message or a credit card number, to remain private. We also
want to be sure that we are communicating with the person or entity we want, and not an impersonator.
Those conditions are achieved by means of cryptographic constructions, whose security usually relies on
the hardness of some well known computational problems.
Besides the theoretical computational complexity of the problems the actual computational power is
taken into account, considering also predictable improvements on the future available computers. Quantum
computers might substantially increase our computational capabilities, as they are based on a di erent
computational paradigm where some problems considered hard on classical computers became e ciently
solvable. This presents a problem for cryptography, as many security proofs rely on the hypothesis of
the hardness of problems that are known to be quantum probabilistically polynomial time computable.
Therefore, new cryptographic primitives have to be used, based on di erent hypothesis. That is, based on
the assumed hardness of di erent problems that are believed to be not quantum e ciently solvable.
The goal of this work is to present new cryptographic protocols useful for electronic voting and to prove
its security against a quantum capable adversary. We focus on proving that votes are casted as intended
by the user and preserve its anonymity.
This thesis is structured in five sections. An introduction (section 1) in which the requirements for
electronic voting are presented and how quantum resistance can be achieved. Section 2 contains the
notation and definitions of all cryptographic primitives that are used, along with the family of mathematical
problems that are considered. Section 3 is devoted to explain some of the protocols that guarantee that a
given encrypted vote is valid and prove to the voter that it has been casted correctly. Finally in section 4
we present a mix-net node used to anonymize the encrypted votes. In the last section (5) we expose some
conclusions and possible future work that could extend what has been presented here.
1.1 Electronic voting, privacy and verifiability
Electronic voting has the potential of improving our democracies providing new ways of participation. This
key role implies that it has to be trustworthy, therefore properties ensuring that an election is fair have to
be carefully defined and mathematically formalized.
Verifiable electronic voting has already been implemented in several countries [PCGK17], and it has
to meet several requirements in order to be equivalent to a classical election. The Council of Europe has
recently adopted new recommendations on standards for e-voting [CoE17]. Some of the usual general
requirements are detailed in the following non exhaustive list:
• Authenticity: only eligible voters should be able to cast a vote.
• Integrity: the results must be obtained from the casted vote of the authorized voters, and no vote
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can be modified, removed or added.
• Anonymity: it must not be possible to find a link between a voter and its choice.
• Coercion resistance: a voter should no be able to show to a third party how he voted.
• Verifiability: it should be possible to verify that the casted vote corresponds to the voter’s choice,
that his vote has been counted and there has been no irregularities during the process.
• Accountability: in case of any failure it should be possible to find the entity responsible for it.
Some of this requirements may seem contradictory. A voter should have access to a proof of his
vote being casted as intended (verifiability), while at the same time he should not be able to prove it to
someone else. This is required to avoid vote selling, as nobody will be willing to pay for a vote if there is no
guarantee that the corrupted voter has chosen the option indicated by the corruptor (coercion resistance).
one possible solution implies a proof of either the vote corresponds to a particular option or this proof was
generated by a particular voter (in this context being generated by a particular voter means that it makes
use of a secret only known by this particular voter). When the voter gets this proof from the voting device
he knows that the device does not known his secret information, hence the vote really encodes his option.
Although, if the voter shows this proof to any other it has no value, as it could have been generated just
knowing the secret information. This would be handled by a cryptographic protocol explained in detail in
section 3.
Votes are encrypted to hide its content (anonymity). At the same time, in order to guarantee that only
eligible voters vote (authenticity) they digitally sign their encrypted votes. Those encrypted and signed
votes are published in a bulletin board, a public place where information can be added by an authority but
not modified. Those votes can not be decrypted directly (as they are linked to the author by the signature),
and several methods exist to guarantee (verifiability) that the content of the votes is not modified (integrity)
while making impossible to link the results to particular voters (anonymity). We propose a mix-net protocol
(a collection of mixing nodes that sequentially re-encrypt and permute the votes) to handle this issue in
section 4.
An electronic voting scheme has to specifically state what can or cannot be compromised in case some
of the parties involved are malicious, and how that could be detected. For example, if the server that
receives the votes is malicious it can omit one of the received votes, but then it would create a discrepancy
with the bulletin board, and the voter would notice. If it modifies or creates new votes it would fail trying
to forge their digital signatures, therefore it would also be noticeable by anyone verifying the election. One
of the most critical points is the decryption process. If only one entity holds the decryption secret key it
could decrypt all signed votes and break anonymity. To avoid this scenario threshold decryption is used,
where the secret key is shared among n parties. Each of them can compute a partial decryption, but at
least t of them are needed to recover the message (with t Æ n). Therefore a malicious coalition of t Õ < t
parties can not recover the message.
This observation would be important in section 4, where several nodes perform the same anonymizing
operation on the votes. The protocol is designed in such a way that it does guarantee that a malicious
node can not modify the content of the votes. However a malicious voter could not anonymize anything
(for example, revealing its random coins), and this property is achieved only if at least one of the nodes
is honest. This is the same approach followed by traditional elections, where all process are performed by
several people, and our guarantees come from not all of them being malicious.
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A complete election scheme that fulfills all the requirements consists of several servers and protocols to
specify the whole voting process. The two protocols presented in this work are key pieces of any e-voting
scheme.
1.2 Quantum computers
The idea of a quantum computer has been proposed for some decades. Even if current prototypes are
very limited many companies and research centers are trying to build larger quantum computers, and the
theoretic results tell as that they would have cumbersome implications for cryptography.
While classical computers store information in bits, a 0 or a 1, quantum computers take advantage of
quantum physics and stores information in the so called qubits, a linear superposition of the base states of
a mechanical system. Using the bra-ket notation |ÂÍ = – |0Í+ — |1Í, where – and — are complex numbers
such that |–|2 + |—|2 = 1.
A quantum 2-qubit state could be |ÂÍ = –00 |00Í + –01 |01Í + –10 |10Í + –11 |11Í. One usual misun-
derstanding is to think that this implies that quantum computers are exponentially faster than classical
computers, or are able to solve any NP problem in polynomial time using as input a linear superposition of
all witnesses. This is not the case, as we also need to understand how the output is read. When we obtain
|ÂÍ = – |0Í+— |1Í as an output we measure it and we get |0Í with probability |–|2 and |1Í with probability
|—|2. The naive approach for solving NP problems exposed before would only return a 1 with a probability
equal to the proportion of valid witnesses, which is no advantage compared with a classical algorithm.
In fact no quantum algorithm is known able to solve an NP-hard problem in polynomial time. However
there are several NP problems not known to be in P with classical computation that can be solved
polynomially with a quantum computer. The most important ones from a cryptographic point of view are
the discrete logarithm and the factorization problem, that can be solved using the Shor’s algorithm [Sho99].
This implies that many cryptographic protocols, whose security hypothesis is related to one of this
problems, would became insecure in presence of a quantum computer. In some cases this might be seen as
a future problem. Using today a quantum insecure protocol to authenticate a user is perfectly acceptable,
as no one has access to a powerful enough quantum computer, hence the user can not be cheating. We
would only need to replace those protocols when quantum computers start to be builded. Although, using
a quantum vulnerable protocol to ensure the privacy of a secret is a bad idea, as some malicious adversary
may store this information until he has access to a quantum computer, and then obtain the secret. This is
particularly important in case of sensitive information, as it is the case for the voting choice in an electronic
voting, where privacy should be preserved long term, even several decades after the election was held.
There are two di erentiated approaches to deal with this problem. Quantum cryptography bases its
security on quantum physical properties of the communication signal. This requires special equipment and
communication channels. While this could be implemented in very specific environments that require this
level of security it may not be necessary in the general case.
While some hard problems became e ciently solvable with a quantum computer there are other prob-
lems suitable for cryptography for which there is no known quantum algorithm able to solve them e ciently.
Sometimes the level of security decreases, that is, if a problem requires an exponential number of operations
to break its security, quantum computer also requires an exponential number, but with a lower constant in
the exponent. This implies that the security parameters have to be stablished taking quantum computers
into account, and then they would still be secure. Many symmetric encryption, hash based, code based,
isogeny based, multivariate polynomials and lattice based schemes are believed to be secure against a
quantum capable adversary, and belong to the so called post-quantum cryptography.
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Post-quantum cryptography uses classical problems and classical algorithms, hence it can be imple-
mented in any regular computer or device, making it the most appealing alternative. We would devote
our work to one specific family of post-quantum primitives, lattice based cryptography. Lattice based
problems are the most promising family of post-quantum problems, as they allow to build from signatures
to public key encryption schemes. The main drawback of most post-quantum alternatives is the size of the
ciphertexts and keys compared with their classical counterpart, specially when considering them integrated
into a chip, but they are usable on any regular computer or mobile device, as has been tested in an experi-
ment driven by Google to use newhope, a lattice based key exchange mechanism [ADPS16], in its browser
communications [Bra16].
1.3 Our contribution
Our contribution consists in two di erent proofs. First, in section section 3 we show how to implement a
coercion resistance cast as intended proof as the one proposed in [GC16], using only existing lattice based
cryptographic primitives. It is a direct application of those primitives.
The main contribution of this thesis is the proof of a shu e for a lattice based mix-net presented in
section 4. It is based on the existing proof of Bayer and Groth for ElGamal encryptions [BG12], but in this
case it is not a direct adaptation. Several modifications have been made to take into account the technical
particularities of lattice cryptography in the online part of the proof, while the second o ine part has been
completely redesigned. We think this is an important contribution, as it is the first proof of a shu e fully
based on lattice based cryptography. This implies that it not only provides long term privacy, but it also
would be sound in a post-quantum scenario.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section we fix the notation, give a background on the cryptographic primitives that are used in this
thesis, explain how we can prove knowledge of something without revealing it with a zero-knowledge proof
and finally introduce lattices, lattice related problems that allow us to build cryptography and the particular
proposals that we use in this work.
2.1 Notation
We represent column vectors by boldface lower-case roman letters u or v and row vectors with their
transpose v|. Matrices are denoted by boldface upper-case roman letters, M or A. Given two vectors
u, v œ ZNq , we write the standard inner product in ZNq as Èu, vÍ =
Nÿ
i=1
uivi .
We write y Ω A(x) when the deterministic algorithm A outputs y on input x . If A is a probabilistic
algorithm then we denote by y $Ω≠ A(x) the process of running A on input x with random coins and getting
an output y . We also write y $Ω≠ Y for sampling y uniformly at random from a set Y and y $Ω≠ D for
sampling y according to a probability distribution D.
Some elements from di erent cryptographic constructions play a similar role and are usually denoted
in the literature with the same letter. We use a subindex to distinguish those variables, aE would be an
element related to encryption while aC would be an element related to a commitment.
Another important notation issue arises from the use of secret permutations. Given a general vector
(v1, v2, ... , vn) and its permutation
1
vﬁ≠1(1), vﬁ≠1(2), ... , vﬁ≠1(n)
2
= (v Õ1, v Õ2, ... , v Õn) using a permutation ﬁ
they may be indexed in di erent ways. Sometimes vﬁ(i) is indexed with i , that is, we know this element is
the one with index the image of i by the permutation, but as the permutation is secret the actual value
j = ﬁ(i) is unknown. Some other times vﬁ(i) is indexed by j = ﬁ(i), that is, we write ﬁ(i) for the reader
to know where this element came from but when published is only labeled as v Õj , preserving the secret of
i = ﬁ≠1(j). This would be particularly explained in each case where there may be doubts.
Definition 2.1 (Negligible function). A positive definite function f (n) is said to be negligible if it decreases
faster than the inverse of every positive polynomial. That is:
’c > 0 ÷n0 œ N | ’n Ø n0 f (n) < 1nc
In all the computational hypothesis we consider that a problem is hard if no Probabilistic Polynomial
Time adversary is able to solve it with non negligible probability. We abbreviate this as a PPT adversary.
If it is not explicitly stated otherwise we will consider quantum adversaries.
We denote the unary representation of ⁄ as 1⁄. This notation is useful as the computational complexity
of an algorithm is determined by the cost as a function of the size of the input. While the size of n is
log n the size of 1⁄ is ⁄, which is more convenient for directly expressing the bits of security of a protocol
without the need of taking logarithms.
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2.2 Cryptographic primitives
A robust electronic voting scheme consists on several protocols that make an extensive use of many
cryptographic primitives. Here we present in detail the main ones, public encryption, commitments and
trapdoor functions.
2.2.1 Public encryption
A public key encryption scheme is intended to be used as a way of ensuring privacy. A public and a private
key are generated. Anybody can use the public key to encrypt a message, knowing the secret key is possible
to recover (decrypt) the message, but without it no relevant information can be extracted e ciently.
This can be formalized in the following way:
Definition 2.2 (Public Key Encryption Scheme). A public key encryption scheme consists on three algo-
rithms:
• Gen: the generator algorithm takes a security parameter 1⁄ and outputs a pair of keys, sk and pk,
the secret and the public key respectively. It also defines the message space M⁄ and the ciphertext
space C⁄. (sk, pk) $Ω≠ Gen
1
1⁄
2
• Enc: the encryption algorithm takes as input a message m œM⁄ and a public key pk and produces
a ciphertext c œ C⁄. c $Ω≠ Enc (m; pk)
• Dec: the decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext c and a secret key sk and outputs a
message mÕ. mÕ $Ω≠ Dec (c ; sk)
And verifies:
Pr
5
m ”= mÕ
----(sk, pk) $Ω≠ Gen 11⁄2 , c $Ω≠ Enc (m; pk) , mÕ $Ω≠ Dec (c ; sk)6 œ negl(⁄)
This definition ensures that anyone can encrypt messages, as the algorithms and the public key are
known. People knowing the secret key can recover, with overwhelming probability, the secret message that
is encrypted in the ciphertext. The first intuition about a public key encryption scheme tells us that besides
this we also need that the original message should not be e ciently obtainable without knowing the secret
key. This can be formalized with the following security definition:
Definition 2.3 (Public Key Encryption One Way Chosen Plaintext Attack Secure (PKE-OW-CPA Secure)).
A public key encryption scheme is said to be OW-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A the following
holds.
Pr
5
mÕ = mú
----(sk, pk) $Ω≠ Gen 11⁄2 , mú $Ω≠M⁄, cú $Ω≠ Enc (mú; pk) , mÕ $Ω≠ A 1cú, pk, 1⁄26 œ negl(⁄)
However, usually this is not enough. An encryption scheme that only modifies the second half of the
message may be PKE-OW-CPA secure if it is hard enough to recover this second half, but reveals a lot
of information about the message. In our electronic voting process we use the following standard stronger
security definition:
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Definition 2.4 (Public Key Encryption Indistinguishable Chosen Plaintext Attack Secure (PKE-IND-CPA
Secure)). A public key encryption scheme is said to be IND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries (A1,A2)
the following holds.
------Pr
SUbÕ = b
------ (sk, pk)
$Ω≠ Gen
1
1⁄
2
, (m0,m1, aux) $Ω≠ A1
1
pk, 1⁄
2
, b $Ω≠ {0, 1} ,
c $Ω≠ Enc (mb; pk) , bÕ $Ω≠ A2
1
c , pk, aux , 1⁄
2
TV≠ 12
------ œ negl(⁄)
That is, the encryptions of two di erent messages should not be distinguishable (the advantage over a
random guess has to be negligible), even if we allow the adversary to choose those messages. Note that
this definition implies that the algorithm has to be probabilistic.
We prove security of an encryption scheme under certain hypothesis proving the existence of a reduction
that implies that a PPT algorithm breaking the security of the encryption could be used to disprove the
hypothesis. We are interested in public key encryption schemes whose security is based in hypothesis
believed to be true in a quantum scenario.
2.2.2 Commitments
Sometimes we want to hide a message not to communicate with someone but to prove that it was fixed
some time before it is revealed and has not been modified. This is the idea of a commitment scheme.
Given a message m we build a commitment c and an opening d and publish the first. Everyone knows
the commitment, but not the message underneath. At some point in the future if we publish the message
and the opening everybody should be convinced that the commitment was generated from this particular
message and no other, and then they know that the message we just revealed was predetermined before we
published the commitment. This construction would be really useful to build an interactive zero-knowledge
proof, where the order in which the information is exchanged is really relevant.
More formally:
Definition 2.5 (Commitment Scheme). A commitment scheme consists on three algorithms:
• Gen: the generator algorithm takes a security parameter 1⁄ and outputs a public key pk. pk $Ω≠
Gen
1
1⁄
2
• Com: the commitment algorithm takes as input a message m and a public key pk and produces a
commitment c and an opening d . (c , d) $Ω≠ Com (m; pk)
• Ver: the verification algorithm takes as input a commitment c , a message m, an opening d and a
public key pk and accepts, 1, or rejects, 0. Ver : {c ,m, d ; pk}æ {0, 1}
And verifies the following three properties:
• Correctness: if the commitment has been built correctly and the valid message and opening are
published the verifier algorithm accepts with overwhelming probability:3
1≠ Pr
5
1Ω Ver (c ,m, d ; pk)
----pk $Ω≠ Gen 11⁄2 , (c , d) $Ω≠ Com (m; pk)64 œ negl(⁄)
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• Binding: a commitment can only be correctly opened to one message. This property can be perfect
or computational.
A commitment scheme is perfectly binding if:
1Ω Ver (c ,m, d ; pk) · 1Ω Ver !c ,mÕ, d Õ; pk" =∆ m = mÕ
A commitment scheme is computationally binding if, for all PPT adversaries A:
Pr
SWU (1Ω Ver (c ,m, d ; pk))· (1Ω Ver (c ,mÕ, d Õ; pk))
·m ”= mÕ
-------pk $Ω≠ Gen
1
1⁄
2
, !c ,m,mÕ, d , d Õ" $Ω≠ A 1pk, 1⁄2
TXV œ negl(⁄)
• Hiding: from a well constructed commitment c it should not be possible to recover the message m.
Again, depending on how we formally describe this we obtain di erent definitions.
A commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if a commitment can be opened to any message:
given (c , d) $Ω≠ Com (m; pk) ,’mÕ ÷d Õ | 1Ω Ver !c ,mÕ, d Õ; pk"
A commitment scheme is computationally hiding if for any PPT adversary (A1,A2):------Pr
SUb = bÕ
------ pk
$Ω≠ Gen(1⁄), (m0,m1, aux) $Ω≠ A1(pk)
b $Ω≠ {0, 1}, (c , d) $Ω≠ Com(mb; pk), bÕ $Ω≠ A2(c , aux)
TV≠ 12
------ œ negl(⁄)
From this definition it is easy to see that one commitment scheme can not be at the same time perfectly
hiding and perfectly binding. In section 2.4.4 we show the commitment scheme we use in our protocols,
which is perfectly hiding (with overwhelming probability) and computationally binding under the RLWE
assumption (that is explained in section 2.4.2). This will be crucial for us, as we will not reveal directly
the openings of any commitment, but instead we will reveal the opening of a polynomial relation between
the messages inside the commitments, therefore we need long term privacy for the messages of the initial
commitments with a long term post-quantum hiding property.
2.2.3 Trapdoor functions
Definition 2.6 (Trapdor Function). A trapdoor function is a function f : X æ Y such that given x œ X we
have that f (x) = y is e ciently computable, but given y œ Y it is hard to obtain a preimage x Õ œ f ≠1(y)
unless some secret information skf is known.
• E ciency: Given a security parameter 1⁄ a generator e ciently samples a function f with a trapdoor
skf from the family of trapdoor functions. Computing f (x) is e cient for any x in X .
• Trapdoor: There exists a PPT algorithm that given f (x) and skf e ciently computes x Õ œ X such
that f (x Õ) = f (x).
• Security: For any PPT algorithm A:
Pr
5
f (x Õ) = f (x)
----(f , skf ) $Ω≠ Gen(1⁄), x $Ω≠ X , x Õ $Ω≠ A(f , f (x))6 œ negl(⁄)
The hardness of the preimage computation should be based on some computational hypothesis.
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2.3 Zero-knowledge proofs
As we have previously explained an electronic voting scheme has to be verifiable while preserving privacy,
and zero-knowledge proofs play a central role. If we want to proof that some element is a valid ciphertext of
a voting option we can prove that we know some random coins such that the element is a valid ciphertext
of that voting option with those random coins, without revealing any information of them. We proof some
proposition proving knowledge of a witness of this proposition being true.
One particular example of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge are ⌃-protocols. Let R be a binary
relation, that is, R is a subset of {0, 1}ú ◊ {0, 1}ú with the following restriction, if (x ,w) œ R then the
size |w | of w is at least p (|x |) for some polynomial p. For (x ,w) œ R we consider x as an instance of a
particular problem and w a solution for this instance, usually called witness.
Definition 2.7 (⌃-protocol). A ⌃-protocol is a protocol between a prover P and a verifier V in which,
given an x , P tries to convince V that it knowns a witness w such that (x ,w) œ R. We use the following
notation:
ZK-proof
Ë
w
--- (x ,w) œ R È
A ⌃-protocol consists of three movements:
1. P sends a message a to V
2. V answers with a random challenge e
3. P sends an answer z , then V accepts or rejects the proof checking the conversation (x , a, e, z).
And has the following properties:
• Completeness: if an honest prover P knowns a valid witness w such that (x ,w) œ R and follows
the protocol, then an honest verifier V always accepts the conversation.
• Soundness: from any pair of accepted conversations (x , a, e, z), (x , a, eÕ, z Õ), with e ”= eÕ, it is
possible to e ciently extract a witness w such that (x ,w) œ R.
• Zero-Knowledge: there exists a polynomial time simulator that takes as input x and a random e and
outputs an accepted conversation (x , a, e, z) with the same probability distribution as conversations
between honest P and V.
The usual structure for a ⌃-protocol is the following:
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Protocol 1: General ⌃-proof.
P (x ;w) V (x)
Ê
$Ω≠W
y , such that (y ,Ê) œ R
(caux, daux) = aCom(y) caux≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ
e $Ω≠ D
eΩ≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠
s = Ê + ew
daux, y , s≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ
aVer(caux, daux, y) ?= accept
(y ü (e ı c) , s) ?œ R
ü and ı should be operations compatible with the relation R, and s should be a witness of y ü (e ı c).
This is possible for many relations with small changes in the protocol. If the prover is honest a witness
could be extracted from s = Ê + ew and s Õ = Ê + eÕw computing w = (s ≠ s Õ) / (e ≠ eÕ). For each
particular protocol it should be proven that this extracted witness is indeed a valid witness, without relying
on the honesty of the prover.
The zero-knowledge property can be relaxed to only require that the probability distributions are statis-
tically close, or are computationally indistinguishable, getting statistical zero-knowledge or computational
zero-knowledge.
It is clear that the completeness property is required if we want the protocol to be useful. Soundness
property may seem more obscure, but it is only bounding the probability of a false positive. If the verifier
is honest the probability of a false positive is at most 1 over the number of challenges (which is usually
exponentially large). Once the commitment has been sent a dishonest prover may know how to answer to
one of the possible challenges, but not two of them, because in that case he would be able to compute a
witness, and would not be dishonest. Finally the zero-knowledge property tell us that a dishonest prover
can fool a verifier with probability exactly 1 over the number of challenges, by generating a simulated
conversation and hoping the verifier sends the same challenge he has chosen. The existence of a simulator
implies that a valid conversation reveals no relevant information, as similar conversations can be simulated
by anyone.
Observation 2.8. Soundness comes from a probability over the choice of the challenge, once the com-
mitment has been fixed, and for this reason the conversation proves something only if it has been done
interactively in the correct order.
However a proof of this kind only convinces the verifier, who is the only person knowing that he has
chosen the challenge randomly after the initial commitment was send. To avoid repeating the proof to
many verifiers usually this interactive protocol is transformed into a non interactive zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge via the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86]. In the Fiat-Shamir transformation only the prover
plays a role, and there is no specific verifier. The random challenge is then replaced by a hash of the
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commitment, trying to emulate the random behavior of the verifier.
Definition 2.9 (Random Oracle). A random oracle O : Aæ B takes queries from A and outputs uniformly
random elements from B, keeping a table of all the previous queries so that if the query has been already
answered it outputs the same element.
The Fiat-Shamir transform is sound in the Random Oracle Model (ROM), where hash functions are
assumed to behave as Random Oracles. However it is not clear how this model could be used in a quantum
scenario. It has been proved that it is quantumly insecure under assumptions that are su cient for classical
security [ARU14]. The Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is defined as the ROM but allowing
queries to be a superposition of elements, answered with a superposition of random elements.
Another problem is the use of rewinding in the Fiat-Shamir transformation. A witness could be extracted
if once the computation has ended we rewind the Turing Machine to the point before the oracle has been
called, then changing the oracle we could get a di erent challenge, run it again and extract the witness
from the two accepted computations. Quantum computers can not be rewinded as a Turing Machine, all
computations are invertible, but we do not know the state of the qubits until we perform a measurement,
and this operation is physically non-rewindable, as the measurement disturbs the state. This same problem
arises when considering the queries to the quantum oracle, that can not be measured.
Unruh proposed in [Unr15] the first and only transformation from an Interactive zero-knowledge Proof to
a Non Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof secure in a quantum scenario. In his proposal the prover computes
several commitments, many challenges for each of them and their corresponding answers. Commitments,
challenges and hashes of answers are published. Then a second hash function is used to determine which
of the challenges to each commitment should be answered, and its corresponding answer is published.
The verifier checks that published conversations are valid and all hashes have been applied correctly (the
answers published when hashed correspond to the pretended hashes, and the answers revealed correspond
to the ones indicated by the second hash function).
’i œ I, ’j œ J
P computes valid conversations:
(x , ai , ei ,j , zi ,j)
P reveals:
(x , ai , ei ,j ,H1(zi ,j))
P computes a hash of all of this to decide which answers to reveal:
h = H2
1
(x , ai , ei ,j ,H1(zi ,j))i ,j
2
œ J |I|
P finally reveals those answers:
’i œ I
(x , ai , ei ,hi , zi ,hi )
This more intricate procedure allows to prove soundness and zero-knowledge in a quantum scenario,
and can be used to transform all our ⌃-protocols into Non Interactive Proofs.
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2.4 Lattices
2.4.1 Introduction to lattices
Definition 2.10 (Lattice). A lattice L is a set of points in an n-dimensional space, usually Rn, with a
periodic structure. That is, the following two conditions hold:
• It is an additive subgroup: 0 œ L and ’x , y œ L ≠ x , x + y œ L
• It is discrete: ’x œ L there exists a neighborhood of x in Rn such that x is the only point of the
lattice.
Usually a lattice is defined by a basis of vectors.
Definition 2.11 (Generated lattice). Given k linearly independent vectors b1, ... ,bk œ Rn, the lattice
generated by them is the following set:
L (b1, ... ,bk) =
I kÿ
i=1
zibi
----- zi œ Z
J
= {Bz | z œ Zn} = L (B)
We have called B to the matrix whose columns are vectors bi . We say b1, ... ,bk form a basis of the lattice
L (B).
A lattice can be defined by di erent basis. Multiplying B by a unimodular matrix U gives us another
basis for the same lattice, in fact all basis for this lattice can be obtained this way.
Theorem 2.12. L(B) = L(BÕ) if and only if there exist a unimodular matrix U such that BÕ = BU.
Proof. Assume BÕ = BU. As U is unimodular its inverse U≠1 is unimodular too. In particular they are
both integer matrices and we also have B = BÕU≠1. Columns of BÕ are integer combinations of columns
of B (L(BÕ) µ L(B)) and columns of B are integer combinations of columns of BÕ (L(B) µ L(BÕ)).
Therefore L(B) = L(BÕ).
Assume L(B) = L(BÕ). Then each colum bÕi of BÕ is a point of the lattice L(B), generated by the
columns of B. Then bÕi = Bui , where ui œ Zk are the corresponding coe cients of the columns of B. We
have BÕ = BU where U is an integer matrix. And by the same argument B = BÕV , where V is another
integer matrix. Combining the two expressions we get BÕ = BÕVU. Then BÕ (VU ≠ Id) = 0. Since BÕ is
non singular VU = Id and U is unimodular.
This is important as some problems over lattices are hard or easy depending on some properties of the
basis defining the lattice that is given as input. Informally, a basis is said to be good if it has short highly
orthogonal vectors, and bad if it has low orthogonality. Some algorithms work well with highly orthogonal
basis, but have a very low probability of success if the basis has low orthogonality. We also say that a
highly orthogonal basis has a low orthogonality defect and vice versa.
Definition 2.13 (Orthogonality defect). The orthogonality defect of a lattice basis B is given by:
”(B) =
rN
i=1 ÎbiÎ
det(B)
It can also be normalized taking the n-root: n

”(B).
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Definition 2.14 (minimum ⁄i). We define the minimum ⁄i (L) as the radius of the smallest hypersphere
centered in the origin that contains at least i linearly independent points of the lattice L.
Nevertheless, transforming a bad basis into a good basis, with short orthogonal vectors, is a di cult
problem. In a two dimensional lattice it can be done performing gaussian elimination. This can be
generalized to an n-dimensional lattice as it is done in the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) algorithm [LLL82],
performing gaussian elimination on the elements of the basis two by two. However the obtained basis has
vectors whose length is still exponentially far from optimal.
This can be improved working with blocks of k vectors, instead of pairs of vectors, as it is done in the
Blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) reduction [SE94]. This algorithm has to find the shortest vector of a
k-dimensional lattice as a subroutine, which is again a hard problem (known as SVP) even approximately,
as will be explained latter in this section.
The last improvements on finding algorithms able to obtain better basis focus on this k-dimensional
SVP problem, following two di erent approaches. Enumeration techniques [FP85, Kan83, GNR] try to do
an exhaustive search, and intend to achieve better e ciency without decreasing so much its performance
cleverly reducing its search space. Sieving techniques [NV08, WLTB11] sample random vectors of the
lattice using small integer linear combinations of the vectors of the basis and tries to find pairs of them
that are close (if two vectors are close its di erence is a short vector of the lattice). In order to improve
e ciency not all di erences are computed, the space is divided into several regions and only sampled lattice
points of the same region are compared. Those regions can be delimited by hyperplanes, cones centered at
the origin, hyperspheres centered at randomly chosen lattice points, etc. Those di erent possibilities yield
up to a great variety of algorithms with di erent performance and computational cost (regarding time and
space).
However, despite all those recent techniques and improvements their computational cost is still ex-
ponential, and some of the algorithms that have better asymptotic cost due to a smaller constant in the
exponent also have worse behavior for smaller dimensions, and the asymptotic improvement only dominates
for dimensions far above what it is used for cryptography.
In order to work with lattices in a computer is preferable to work modulo a prime q. A q-ary lattice is
an integer lattice where the belonging of a point x to the lattice is determined by x mod q.
Definition 2.15 (q-ary lattices). A lattice L is said to be q-ary if qZn ™ L ™ Zn, for an integer q.
Definition 2.16 (Dual Lattice). The dual lattice of L µ Rn is Lú := {w |Èw ,LÍ ™ Z}.
There are two usual ways of representing a q-ary lattice given a matrix A œ Zn◊mq . The first one is
called the ⇤q form:
⇤q(A) = {y œ Zn | y = Az mod q : z œ Zm} (1)
And the other is called the orthogonal ⇤q form:
⇤‹q (A) =
Ó
y œ Zn
--- ATy = 0 mod qÔ (2)
Proposition 2.17. Lattices ⇤q(A) and ⇤‹q (A) are dual of each other, up to normalization. ⇤‹q (A) =
q⇤q(A)ú and ⇤q(A) = q⇤‹q (A)ú.
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Proof.
⇤‹q (A) ™ q⇤q(A)ú ⇤‹q (A) ´ q⇤q(A)ú
y œ ⇤‹q (A) ™ Zn y œ q⇤q(A)ú
yTA = 0 mod q y = qy Õ, y Õ œ ⇤q(A)ú
yTA = qaT , a œ Zm yTA = qy ÕTA
(q≠1y)TA = aT yTA = qa, a œ Zm
(q≠1y)T (Az) = aT z œ Z yTA = 0 mod q
(q≠1y) œ ⇤q(A)ú y œ ⇤‹q (A)
y œ q⇤q(A)ú =∆ q⇤q(A)ú ™ ⇤‹q (A)
=∆ ⇤‹q (A) ™ q⇤q(A)ú
From the definition of the dual lattice it is easy to see that the dual of a dual lattice is the original lattice
itself (Lú)ú = L (this can be proved finding a basis of the dual lattice in terms of a basis of the original
lattice) and that (qL)ú = q≠1Lú (direct consequence of the definition). Applying those two properties to
the previous equation we get: 1
⇤‹q (A)
2ú
= (q⇤q(A)ú)ú
q
1
⇤‹q (A)
2ú
= ⇤q(A)
Now we can define some of the problems whose hardness will be used as hypothesis for our cryptographic
constructions.
Definition 2.18 (Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (“-SVP)). Given a base B of a lattice L (B)
the Approximate Shortest Vector Problem, or “-SVP, is to find a non-zero vector v œ L (B) such that
ÎvÎ Æ “ · ⁄1 (L (B)).
The di culty of this problem depends on the approximating factor “. If “ = 1 it is called the Shortest
Vector Problem (SVP). Our problems involve a “(n) being a polynomial of the dimension of the lattice. It
has been proven to be an NP-hard problem in its exact version and also for some subpolynomial approxi-
mations [Ajt98]. The best algorithms for the approximated versions have exponential cost [GN08] and it
is believed that no PPT algorithm exists.
This same problem is called Short Integer Solution (SIS) when described in terms of the dual lattice.
Finding short vectors in a dual lattice ⇤‹q (A) is finding short integer solutions to the linear system Ax = 0
Definition 2.19 (Approximate Closest Vector Problem (“-CVP)). Given a base B of a lattice L (B) and
a target vector t, the Approximate Closest Vector Problem, or “-CVP, is to find a vector u œ L (B) such
that if v = argmin
wœL(B)
Ît ≠wÎ, then Îu ≠ vÎ Æ “ Ît ≠ vÎ.
Finally the main problem we work with is the following:
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Definition 2.20 (Learning With Errors (LWE)). Let n, q be integers (q usually prime), ‰ a discrete
probability distribution in Z (usually a discrete Gaussian distribution) and s a secret vector from Znq.
We denote Ls,‰ the probability distribution over Znq ◊ Zq obtained by choosing a œ Znq uniformly at
random, choosing e $Ω≠ ‰ and considering it in Zq and finally calculating (a, c = Èa, sÍ+ e) œ Znq ◊ Zq.
The Decisional Learning With Errors problem, or Decisional-LWE, is to decide if pairs (a, c) are samples
of Ls,‰ or come from the uniform distribution of Znq ◊ Zq.
The Search Learning With Errors problem, or Search-LWE, is to recover s from samples (a, c) obtained
from Ls,‰.
If the number of samples provided is polynomial those problems are believed to be hard (it is as hard as
the approximated SVP [LPR13]), even if the secret s is chosen component by component from the error
distribution ‰ [SG16].
Considering all polynomially many samples as rows in a matrix we can see the problem as (A,As + e).
If we see A as a basis of a lattice then the search problem becomes recovering the coordinates of a lattice
point after adding some error e, while the decision problem is to distinguish uniformly random points in
Zn from perturbed lattice points.
If A is a basis of a full rank lattice, i.e., it is a non singular square matrix, then its size is quadratic
in the dimension n, and this yields to a high communication cost. It can be reduced to linear cost if we
restrict ourselves to a particular class of lattices.
2.4.2 Ideal Lattices
Fixed a vector f we define the transformation matrix F as:SWWWWWU
0 ... 0 ≠f0
. . . ≠f1
Idn≠1
...
. . . ≠fn≠1
TXXXXXV
Definition 2.21 (Ideal Lattice). An ideal lattice is a lattice L that has as a basis a matrix A constructed
from a vector a and a transformation matrix F in the following way:
A =
Ë
a,Fa, ... ,Fn≠1a
È
Those lattices are called ideal lattices as they can be seen as ideals in the polynomial ring Rq =
Zq [x ] / Èf (x)Í, where f (x) = xn + fn≠1xn≠1 + · · ·+ f0 œ Zq [x ] is a polynomial given by the vector of the
transformation matrix. From this point we will identify any other vector v = (v1, v2, ... , vn) œ Znq with a
polynomial v = v1 + v2x + · · ·+ vnxn≠1 œ Rq. It can be easily checked that, by construction, multiplying
two polynomials a and b in the ring Rq is equivalent to multiply the matrix A constructed from the vector
a with the vector b. Then, lattice points of L(A) are, as polynomials, elements of the principal ideal
ÈaÍ µ Rq.
We choose f to be (1, 0, ... , 0), so that f (x) = xn+1, with n a power of 2, and Rq = Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í,
as it gives us good security reductions and allows us to speed up computations using the Fast Fourier
Transform.
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This way the matrix A is an anti-cyclic integer matrix:
A =
Qcccccca
a1 ≠an ≠an≠1 ... ≠a2
a2 a1 ≠an ... ≠a3
a3 a2 a1 ... ≠a4
... ... ... . . . ...
an an≠1 an≠2 ... a1
Rddddddb
No algorithm is known to be able to take advantage of the structure in ideal lattices to e ciently
solve the problems presented before when restricted to their ideal cases. In particular we make use of
cryptographic primitives based on the ideal version of the learning with errors algorithm, called ring learning
with errors, or RLWE.
2.4.3 Encryption with RLWE
Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev proposed in [LPR13] the following encryption scheme based on the
hardness of RLWE:
• Gen: the key generator algorithm outputs (Rq,‰‡, sk = s, pk = (aE, bE)) $Ω≠ Gen
1
1⁄
2
. Rq =
Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í is a polynomial ring where n and q have been chosen according to ⁄. ‰‡ is a
discretized Gaussian distribution over Rq with standard deviation ‡ = –q/
Ô
2ﬁ. aE $Ω≠ Rq is ob-
tained uniformly at random, s, e $Ω≠ ‰‡ are small elements obtained from the error distribution and
bE is computed bE = aE · s + e. That is, the public key is a RLWE sample (aE, bE) and the secret
key is the corresponding secret s.
• Enc: the encryption algorithm takes as input a message m œ {0, 1}n encoded as a polynomial in Rq
with 0 or 1 coe cients and a public key (aE, bE). It chooses small random elements rE, eu, ev $Ω≠ ‰‡
and computes the ciphertext (u, v) = !aE · rE + eu, bE · rE + ev + %q2 (m" œ Rq ◊ Rq.
• Dec: the decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext (u, v) and a secret key s and computes:
v ≠ s · u = bE · rE + ev +
7q
2
:
m ≠ s(aE · rE + eu)
= s · aE · rE + e · rE + ev +
7q
2
:
m ≠ s · aE · rE ≠ s · eu
= e · rE + ev ≠ s · eu +
7q
2
:
m
¥
7q
2
:
m
If the standard deviation ‡ of the distribution error is small enough compared with %q2 ( we can recover
the message m with overwhelming probability rounding the coe cients of the polynomial to either 0 or%q
2
(, whichever is closer mod q. We also introduce the possibility of a re-encryption:
• Re-Enc: the re-encryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext (u, v) and a public key (aE, bE).
It choses small random elements r ÕE, eÕu, eÕv
$Ω≠ ‰‡ from the error distribution and computes the re-
encrypted ciphertext Re≠ Enc (u, v) = (u + aE · r ÕE + eÕu, v + bE · r ÕE + eÕv ) œ Rq ◊ Rq.
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When decrypting a re-encrypted ciphertext we obtain: e · (rE + r ÕE) + (ev + eÕv )≠ s · (eu + eÕu) +
%q
2
(m.
The errors may grow linearly, so only a limited number of re-encryptions can be performed if we want to
keep a high probability of decrypting without errors. This is not a problem, as our protocols perform a fixed
small number of re-encryptions, so that the parameters ‡ and q can be selected taking it into account.
Theorem 2.22. The above cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure assuming the hardness of decision-RLWE.
Proof. Assume A = (A1,A2) is a PPT adversary such that the following quantity is non negligible in ⁄:------Pr
SUbÕ = b
------ (s, (aE, bE))
$Ω≠ Gen
1
1⁄
2
, (m0,m1, aux) $Ω≠ A1
1
(aE, bE) , 1⁄
2
, b $Ω≠ {0, 1} ,
(u, v) $Ω≠ Enc (mb; pk) , bÕ $Ω≠ A2
1
(u, v) , (aE, bE) , aux , 1⁄
2
TV≠ 12
------
Let (a1, c1) , (a2, c2) œ Rq◊Rq be two pairs that can be uniformly random pairs (probability 1/2) or RLWE
samples (probability 1/2). If they are random polynomials then:
------Pr
SUbÕ = b
------ (m0,m1, aux)
$Ω≠ A1
1
(a1, a2) , 1⁄
2
, b $Ω≠ {0, 1} ,!u = c1, v = c2 + %q2 (mb" , bÕ $Ω≠ A2 1(u, v) , (a1, a2) , aux , 1⁄2
TV≠ 12
------ = 0
As the uniformly random element c2 completely masks the chosen message the output bÕ is independent
of b, and the probability of correctly guessing the bit is exactly 1/2.
If (a1, c1) , (a2, c2) are real RLWE samples there are two possibilities, either the di erence with 1/2 is
non negligible (allowing us to solve the decision-RLWE with non negligible probability) or it is negligible.
In this second case it means that the adversary A works well when the elements (a1, a2) playing the role
of the public key (aE, bE) are a real RLWE sample, but not when they are two random polynomials, which
also gives us a way to distinguish random pairs from RLWE samples, playing the same game this time
choosing a2 to be the element that can be a uniformly random polynomial or a RLWE sample of the lattice
generated by a1.
Observation 2.23. Notice that we do not know a priori which of those possibilities would be true, but all
of them allow us to distinguish RLWE samples from random elements, using di erent strategies.
2.4.4 Commitments with RLWE
We use for our constructions the commitment proposed by Benhamouda et al. in [BKLP15], as it allows
us to commit to a message and furthermore it allows us to prove in zero-knowledge polynomial relations
between the messages committed.
It is a commitment scheme perfectly binding with overwhelming probability under the choice of the
public key and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption. This long term privacy is very important
for us, as we do not plan to open most of the commitments we construct during our protocols.
In order to achieve the binding property this scheme makes use of vectors of polynomials, that we
denote by lowercase boldface roman letters as integer vectors like a œ (Rq)k . It also needs that the prime
q is q © 3 mod 8. This implies xn +1 splits into two irreducible polynomials of degree n/2 [BGM93], and
every polynomial of degree smaller than n/2 is invertible.
The commitment scheme is defined by the following three algorithms:
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• Gen: the generator algorithm takes a security parameter 1⁄ and outputs a public key pk = (aC,bC) $Ω≠
Gen
1
1⁄
2
, where aC,bC are uniformly random vectors of polynomials aC,bC $Ω≠ (Rq)k and parameters
as n or k are defined by Gen acording to ⁄.
• Com: the commitment algorithm takes as input a message m and a public key (aC,bC) and produces
a commitment c and an opening d . (c = aCm + bCrC + eC, d = (m, rC, eC, 1)) $Ω≠ Com (m; pk).
Polynomial rC is chosen uniformly at random from Rq and vector of polynomials eC is obtained from
an error distribution ‰‡e .
• Ver: the verification algorithm takes as input a commitment c, a message with its opening (mÕ, r ÕC, eÕC,
f Õ), and a public key (aC,bC) and accepts if the following conditions hold:
aCmÕ + bCr ÕC + f Õ≠1eÕC = c ·
..eÕC..Œ Æ
E
n4/3
2
H
· ..f Õ..Œ Æ 1 · degf Õ Æ n2
This is not a standard commitment scheme as the accepted openings are relaxed from the produced
openings (the commitment algorithm always generates f = 1 while in the opening it is accepted to have a
low degree polynomial with infinity norm 1). That is, we use knowledge of (x ,w) œ R to prove knowledge
of (x ,w Õ) œ R Õ, with R ( R Õ. This relaxation would be necessary for the following zero-knowledge proofs,
but does not compromise the binding property. Benhamouda et al. give in [BKLP15] a combinatorial
argument showing that even allowing openings with f ”= 1 the probability over the choice of the public key
of the existence of a commitment with valid openings to two di erent messages is negligible in the security
parameter if all the parameters q, n, k are chosen correctly. The hiding property is clearly based on the
hardness of RLWE.
Some commitments schemes, as Pedersen Commitment [Ped91], are homomorphic as a commitment
of the sum of two messages can be obtained from the product of the commitments to each message. With
Pedersen commitments also the commitment of a scalar multiplied by a message can be computed expo-
nentiating a commitment to the message to that scalar. This commitment scheme is specially interesting
as, even if it is not directly homomorphic, allows someone knowing the openings to prove knowledge of a
valid opening and polynomial relations between the messages of di erent commitments. We expose here
the protocol presented by Benhamouda et al. for proving knowledge of a valid opening, as it uses some
ideas that are worth to discuss and also gives us a flavor of the complexity of this kind of proofs.
ZK-proof
Ë
m, rC, eC, f
---Ver(c;m, r , e, f ) = accept È (3)
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Protocol 2: Simple preimage proof.
P (c;m, rC, eC) V (c)
µ, ﬂ $Ω≠ Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í
÷
$Ω≠ ‰k‡÷
t = aCµ+ bCﬂ+ ÷
(caux, daux) = aCom(t) caux≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ
d $Ω≠ C ™ Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í
dΩ≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠
sm = µ+ dm
sr = ﬂ+ drC
se = ÷ + deC
abort with probability:
exp
3
≠2Èse ,deCÍ+ÎdeCÎ2
2‡2÷
4
daux, t≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æsm,sr ,se
aVer(caux, daux, t) ?= accept
t + dc ?= aCsm + bCsr + se
ÎseÎŒ
?Æ
Í
n4/3/4
Î
It follows the usual scheme of a zero-knowledge proof described in protocol 1. Given c, to prove
knowledge of m, rC, eC the prover P builds t following the same structure with random masking param-
eters µ, ﬂ,÷. It commits to t using an auxiliary commitment scheme, receives a challenge d and then
builds t + dc, reveals its opening and the verifier V checks that everything follows the expected restric-
tions. However the possible extracted witness has a factor (d ≠ d Õ)≠1, this is generally not important,
but our commitment scheme requires the e parameter to be small, while we get a small vector multi-
plied by the inverse of a di erence of polynomials. That is why Benhamouda et al. designed in the
first place its commitment allowing this f ≠1, and this protocol chooses challenges d from the subset
C = {d œ {0, 1}n : ÎdÎ1 Æ Ÿ · degd Æ n/2}, so that the di erences (d ≠ d Õ) may be a valid f . The
property of q © 3 mod 8 also ensures that this f is invertible.
The other main di erence is that, as ﬂ is uniformly random then sr = ﬂ+ drC is also uniformly random
and reveals no information about rC. However ÷ is not uniformly random, as it is required to follow a distri-
bution ‰k‡÷ . Then se = ÷+deC reveals some information about eC, as it is a discrete Gaussian distribution
centered at deC. To correct this the protocol aborts with a probability of exp
3
≠2Èse ,deCÍ+ÎdeCÎ2
2‡2÷
4
, implying
that the distribution of revealed se is statistically indistinguishable from a discrete Gaussian distribution
centered at the origin.
This technique, called Fiat-Shamir with aborts, provides statistically zero-knowledge property because
of the following theorem:
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Theorem 2.24 (Vadim Lyubashevsky [Lyu12]). Let V be a subset of Zl in which all elements have norms
less than T , and let h be a probability distribution over V . Then, for any constant M, there exists a
‡ = Â⇥(T ) such that the output distribution of the following algorithms A, F are statistically close.
A : F :
v $Ω≠ h; z $Ω≠ ‰lv ,‡; v $Ω≠ h; z $Ω≠ ‰l‡;
output (z, v) with probability: output (z, v) with probability:
min
A
exp
A
≠2 Èz, vÍ+ ÎvÎ2
2‡2
B
, 1
B
1
M
Moreover the probability that A outputs something is exponentially close to 1/M.
With those aborts the probability distribution of revealed se is exponentially close to a probability
distribution centered in the origin and non dependent on de. The expected number of iterations until there
is no abort is a constant M, that depends on ‡.
This protocol can be adapted to prove that a commitment contains a specific linear combination of the
messages committed in other commitments (protocol 3).
It follows the same strategy, to prove that commitments c1, c2, c3 contains messages such that m3 =
⁄1m1 + ⁄2m2 it creates masking parameters for c1 and c2 and uses a linear combination of them with
coe cients ⁄1 and ⁄2 to build the masking parameters of c3. We can prove linear relations as large as we
want, but the probability of abortion increases with each term. For practical purposes it will be implemented
adding all the terms consecutively one by one, and providing a proof for each of these partial sums.
It is also possible to prove knowledge of multiplicative relations, with protocol 4. This time we have to
take into account that multiplying the commitments we get cross terms, and we have to create masking
parameters for them.
Those protocols are the ones proposed by Benhamouda et al. (or direct generalizations) in [BKLP15]
and the details of the proofs can be found there. In order to prove arbitrary polynomial relations we will
need to run several instances of protocols 3 and 4.
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ZK-proof
SWUmi , ri , e i , fi
-------
(ml = ⁄1m1 + · · ·+ ⁄l≠1ml≠1)
lw
i=1
(Ver(ci ;mi , ri , e i , fi) = accept)
TXV (4)
Protocol 3: Linear relation proof.
P (c i ;mi , ri , ei) V (c i)
µ1, ... ,µl≠1 $Ω≠ Rq
ﬂ1, ... , ﬂl $Ω≠ Rq
µl = ⁄1µ1 + · · ·+ ⁄l≠1µl≠1
÷1, ... ,÷l
$Ω≠ ‰k‡÷
for i = 1, ... , l
t i = aµi + bﬂi + ÷i
(caux, daux) = aCom(t1, ... , t l) caux≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ
d $Ω≠ C
dΩ≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠
for i = 1, ... , l
smi = µi + dmi
sri = ﬂi + dri
sei = ÷i + de i
abort with probability:
lŸ
i=1
e
3
≠2Èsei ,dei Í+ÎdeiÎ2
2‡2÷
4
daux, t i≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æsmi ,sri ,sei
aVer(caux, daux, (t1, ... , t l)) ?= accept
sml = ⁄1sm1 + · · ·+ ⁄l≠1sml≠1
for i = 1, ... , l
t i + dc i ?= asmi + bsri + se i
Îse iÎ
?Æ
Í
n4/3/4
Î
ZK-proof
C
mi , ri , e i , fi
----- (m3 = m1m2) ·
3ﬁ
i=1
(Ver(ci ;mi , ri , e i , fi) = accept)
D
(5)
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Protocol 4: Multiplicative relation proof.
P (c i ;mi , ri , ei) V (c i)
µ1,µ2,µ3 $Ω≠ Rq
ﬂ1, ﬂ2, ﬂ3 $Ω≠ Rq
÷1,÷2,÷3
$Ω≠ ‰k‡÷
for i = 1, 2, 3
t i = aµi + bﬂi + ÷i
m+ = µ1m2 + µ2m1
m◊ = µ1µ2
r+, r◊ $Ω≠ Rq
e+, e◊ $Ω≠ ‰k‡e
c+ = am+ + br+ + e+
c◊ = am◊ + br◊ + e◊
µ+,µ◊, ﬂ+, ﬂ◊ $Ω≠ Rq
÷+,÷◊
$Ω≠ ‰k‡÷
t+ = aµ+ + bﬂ+ + ÷+
t◊ = aµ◊ + bﬂ◊ + ÷◊Âﬂ $Ω≠ RqÂ÷ $Ω≠ ‰k‡÷Ât = bÂﬂ+ Â÷
(caux, daux) = aCom
1
t+,t◊,t i ,Ât,c+,c◊ 2 caux≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ d $Ω≠ CdΩ≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠
for i = 1, 2, 3,+,◊
smi = µi + dmi
sri = ﬂi + dri
sei = ÷i + de iÂe = ≠d2e3 ≠ e◊ ≠ de+Âr = ≠d2r3 ≠ r◊ ≠ dr+
s Âe = Â÷ + dÂe
sÂr = Âﬂ+ dÂr
abort-cheks for s Âe , sej daux, t+, t◊, t i ,Ât, c+, c◊≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æsmi ,sri ,sei ,sÂr ,sÂe
aVer(caux, daux, (t+, t◊, t i ,Ât, c+, c◊)) ?= accept
for i = 1, 2, 3,+,◊
t i + dc i ?= asmi + bsri + se i
Îse iÎ
?Æ
Í
n4/3/4
Î
Âc = asm1sm2 ≠ d2c3 ≠ c◊ ≠ dc+Ât + dÂc ?= bsÂr + s Âe..s Âe.. ?Æ Ín4/3/4Î
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2.4.5 Trapdoors with lattices
Generally backdoors are something to avoid. For example in case of a commitment scheme the security
proof for the hiding property states that it is hard to recover the message with the assumption that the
public key has been chosen randomly. However, for some particular specially generated public keys there
may be some information that allows a malicious entity to recover the message looking at the commitment.
Because of this, when a public key has to be generated at random, in order to prove that it is really
random and not fixed by the generator, it is obtained from a seed with an extendable output function, that
guarantees that there is no special property that might be used as a backdoor.
In our case we propose to use SHA-3 standard extendable output functions (XOF) defined in [Dwo15]
to avoid backdoors, but we also require the use of backdoors to construct more complex protocols with the
required properties. In order to build a backdoor hash we will need a lattice based trapdoor function.
Peikert and Micciancio explain in [MP12] how to build lattice based trapdoor functions for the following
families of functions:
fA : D æ Znq
x ‘æ Ax
gA : Znq æ Zmq
x ‘æ A|x + e
D is a subset of small vectors, and e is obtained from a discrete gaussian distribution and also has
small norm. For someone without the trapdoor it is hard to find collisions. An adversary A able to find a
collision could solve some hard problems.
x, y Ω A s.t. fA(x) = fA(y), x, y œ D
=∆ Ax = Ay =∆ A(x ≠ y) = 0 (solve SIS)
x, y Ω A s.t. gA(x) = gA(y), x, y œ Znq
=∆ A|x + ex = A|y + ey
=∆ A|(x ≠ y) = (ey ≠ ex) (solve SVP)
We focus on the first one. We start with G (built as a tensor product of an identity matrix and a
primitive vector, the details of this construction are explained in [MP12]) a primitive public matrix for
which we know how to calculate preimages of fG . We extend it to a semirandom matrix AÕ =
Ë
A
---GÈ,
concatenating it with a uniformly random matrix A.
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fAÕ
A
x1
x2
B
=
Ë
A
---GÈAx1x2
B
= Ax1 + Gx2 = y
f ≠1AÕ (y) =
1
x1|
---f ≠1G 1y ≠ Ax12|2| (x1 randomly chosen from a suitable distribution)
Finally we multiply it by a transformation matrix T =
A
I ≠R
0 I
B
. We observe that its inverse is
T≠1 =
A
I R
0 I
B
.
A = AÕ · T =
Ë
A
---GÈAI ≠R0 I
B
=
Ë
A
---G ≠ ARÈ
We can invert it into two steps, first inverting AÕ and then inverting T . Here we take advantage of the
fact that, if coe cients of R are small then the coe cients of the inverse of T , are small too, and we still
get small solutions:
fA(x) = AÕTx
f ≠1A (y) = T≠1f ≠1AÕ (y)
The final matrix A is pseudorandom and it is di cult to invert without knowing the trapdoor R, while
knowledge of R allows to easily obtain preimages of fA. Peikert and Micciancio give more details of the
security of this construction and e cient ways of obtaining preimages of G in [MP12].
2.4.6 Small secrets
All lattice based cryptographic constructions make an extensive use of small vectors. For this reason it is of
paramount importance to know how to prove knowledge of some small vectors. Some problems may arise,
one is e ciency and the other is a possible soundness gap, that is, knowing a vector with norm smaller
than — the prover is only able to prove knowledge of a vector of size smaller than “—, where “ may be a
constant, polynomial or even exponential in the size of the vector in the worst case.
We can write the encryption of a message z in matrix form:
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Qccccccccca
u1
...
un
v1
...
vn
Rdddddddddb
=
7q
2
:
Qccccccccca
0
...
0
z1
...
zn
Rdddddddddb
+
Qcccccccccccccccccca
a1 ≠an ≠an≠1 · · · ≠a2
a2 a1 ≠an · · · ≠a3
a3 a2 a1 · · · ≠a4
... ... ... . . . ...
an an≠1 an≠2 · · · a1
b1 ≠bn ≠bn≠1 · · · ≠b2
b2 b1 ≠bn · · · ≠b3
b3 b2 b1 · · · ≠b4
... ... ... . . . ...
bn bn≠1 bn≠2 · · · b1
Rddddddddddddddddddb
Qcccccca
r ÕE,1
r ÕE,2
r ÕE,3...
r ÕE,n
Rddddddb+
Qccccccccca
eÕu,1...
eÕu,n
eÕv ,1...
eÕv ,n
Rdddddddddb
Qccccccccca
u1
...
un
v1 ≠
%q
2
( z1
...
vn ≠
%q
2
( zn
Rdddddddddb
=
A
A Idn 0n
B 0n Idn
B
Qccccccccccccccccca
r ÕE,1...
r ÕE,n
eÕu,1...
eÕu,n
eÕv ,1...
eÕv ,n
Rdddddddddddddddddb
y = AÕx
--- ÎxÎŒ Æ —
(6)
The problem of proving knowledge of small random elements r ÕE, eÕu, eÕv is equivalent to prove knowledge
of a vector x such that AÕx = y mod q with ÎxÎŒ Æ —, that is, we know a solution of the Inhomogeneous
Short Integer Solution (ISIS) problem. There are two main approaches in the literature. We first consider
the proposal by Ling et al. in [LNSW13], based on a code based construction of Stern [Ste96]. We have
to consider some modifications, in our case the security of the proof is given by the hardness of solving the
RLWE problem, instead of the general ISIS problem. Using RLWE we can take advantage of faster matrix
vector multiplications as they can be seen as polynomial multiplications, for which FFT can be used. We
expose here a brief description of the protocol of Ling et al.
Given (A, y) we want to prove knowledge of x such that Ax = y , ÎxÎ Æ —. This protocol, when
knowing ÎxÎ Æ — allows us to prove ÎxÎ Æ 2—. Carefully choosing — or slightly modifying the protocol it
is possible to remove this gap.
The idea consists in proving that it is possible to write the coe cients of x with k = Álog —Ë bits
({≠1, 0, 1}). In order not to reveal those bits, elements from {≠1, 0, 1} are added so that the number of
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each of them is the same, and then the result is permuted.
x = (x1, ... , xm)
xi =
k≠1ÿ
j=0
2jbi ,j , bi ,j œ {≠1, 0, 1}
Âuj = (b1,j , ... , bm,j) , Âuj œ {≠1, 0, 1}m , x = k≠1ÿ
j=0
2j Âuj
uj = ( Âuj |tj ) (so that it has the same number of ≠1, 0 and 1)
AÕ = (A|0) , AÕ
k≠1ÿ
j=0
2juj = y
During the proof the prover randomly chooses:
r0, ... , rk≠1 $Ω≠ Z3mq
ﬁ0, ... ,ﬁk≠1 $Ω≠ S3m
And generates the following commitments:
c1 = Com
Qaﬁ0, ... ,ﬁk≠1,AÕ k≠1ÿ
j=0
2jrj
Rb
c2 = Com (ﬁ0(r0), ... ,ﬁk≠1(rk≠1))
c3 = Com (ﬁ0(r0 + u0), ... ,ﬁk≠1(rk≠1 + uk≠1))
The verifier randomly chooses a challenge in {1, 2, 3} and the other two corresponding commitments
are opened.
• If c2, c3 are revealed it is proved that uj are indeed small.
• If c1, c3 are revealed it can be checked that the sum of uj is y (if the element committed in c1 is the
sum of rj ).
• If c1, c2 are revealed then it can be checked that there is no cheating on the rj , they are permuted
as expected and their sum is the one that was compromised.
This protocol can be simulated 1/3 of the times, therefore it is needed to repeat it several times to
achieve a high soundness. Commitments to the permutations are done committing to the seed that would
generate pseudorandom permutations.
Benoˆıt et al. extended this idea based on the Stern protocol for small secrets that satisfy non-linear
relations [LLM+16]. Xie et al. particularized the same protocol to ring lattices in [XXW13], allowing them
to proof knowledge of a secret that satisfies any polynomial relation, with an almost optimal gap factor (or
even no gap factor with the cost of larger communication complexity). However they still have the problem
of only having a soundness of 2/3 and make use of a specific commitment scheme.
Recently Cramer et al. proposed an amortized protocol [CDXY17], improved by del Pino and Lyuba-
shevsky [dPL17], where they are able to reduce the size of the proofs when they are used to prove multiple
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times the knowledge of di erent witnesses of the same linear relation. More improvements are being made
for this amortized proofs, with new approaches as the one from Baum and Lyubashevsky proposing a novel
protocol [BL17]. The one that best fits our requirements is [dPL17], as it achieves a constant gap, requires
a small quantity of instances to achieve amortization and can be optimized for ring lattices.
This protocol is based on the rejection sampling method explained in theorem 2.24, combined with
imperfect proofs.
• The prover creates many masking parameters and commits to them.
• The verifier asks the prover to reveal a fraction of the masking parameters to check that they are
small. It also sends challenges.
• The prover answers as an standard proof of knowledge but aborts with a probability given by theo-
rem 2.24.
• The verifier checks everything.
However, once we check the properties of this protocol we find that it is only an imperfect proof, that
is, the verifier is convinced that the prover knows a small x such that f (x) = y for all instances except for
a fixed quantity k. There is a standard technique for transforming and imperfect proof of knowledge into
a proof of knowledge, consisting in repeating the process several times with some instances constructed
from the original ones. Even with this requirements this is the most e cient zero-knowledge proof we have
found in the literature, as it allows us to perform many optimizations. The fraction of commitments that
has to be revealed can be optimized depending on the number of instances and all the random elements
can be calculated from seeds forming a Merkel Tree, largely decreasing the communication cost and the
final size of the proof.
29
Fully post-quantum protocols for electronic voting
3. Voting process
Electronic voting might allow voters to vote from their personal computers or even their mobile phones.
While this can be seen as an advantage that could be simpler than postal vote, some concerns may arise
about its security. Some of them might even have to be considered when voting from a dedicated machine
in a polling station. Once the voting option is encrypted it is signed with the private key of the voter, sent
to the voting server and published in the bulletin board. Looking at the bulletin board the voter can check
that his vote has been correctly casted, and verifying the following proofs he can be convinced that his
vote has been counted in the final tally. But even though the vote has been counted the voter does not
know if the encrypted vote contains his vote option or a di erent one. A corrupted computer could also
reveal the vote to a third party.
In order to avoid the first malfunction it is not possible to reveal to the voter the random coins used in
the encryption, as then he could prove his vote choice to a third party and sell his vote. We need a way to
prove the voter that the encrypted vote stored in the bulletin board contains a specific vote choice, without
allowing him to prove this to others, and without relaying on the honesty of his voting machine (maybe
relaying on the honesty of di erent devices). That is, we need the coercion resistance cast as intended
property. A malicious machine should not be able to modify the option of an honest voter, a corrupted
voter using an honest machine should not be able to prove his vote to a corruptor.
3.1 Coercion resistant cast as intended
One of the options presented in the literature are return codes. We want to avoid the possibility of our
computer cheating on us, so we made the voting server to prove us that it has received the option we
wanted. We do not want it to know what is our option, so the process takes several steps.
• During the registration in the election the voter applies a secret deterministic one way function to
each of the voting options, the images are called partial return codes.
• Also during the registration the voting server applies another secret deterministic one way function
to the partial return codes, and prints them in a card that is given to the voter (or is handled to him
through a secure channel).
• During the voting the personal computer sends to the voting server the signed encrypted voting
option, the corresponding partial return code and a proof of this partial return code being the one
corresponding to the encrypted option.
• The voting server receives the signed encrypted vote and the partial return code with its proof, checks
the proof, applies its secret deterministic one way function to the partial return code and sends it
back to the voter.
• The voter checks in the card that the return code corresponds with the option he has chosen.
Those secret functions should behave properly. They should be di cult to invert even if there is a small
set of possible preimages, and also di cult to compute one preimage even if we know the image of another
element.
This strategy is coercion resistant, only the voter and the server known the return codes, so if the voter
receives a return code he is convinced that the return code has been computed by the server. However, he
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can not convince a third party, as this third party does not known that the return code is an answer from
the server or just the voter showing him the corresponding return code from his card.
The main disadvantage of this approach, besides the requirement of di erent devices that should not
collude, one for voting and one for receiving the return codes, is the active participation of the voter. Only
the voter is able to verify that the return code is what was expected to be, but we do not know if he has
carefully checked it. We aim for a universally verifiable coercion resistance cast as intended, that is, if the
voter is honest anyone should be able to verify that his encrypted vote corresponds to his option, without
revealing it.
Another simpler option is known as Challenge or cast. Once the vote is encrypted the voter sees it and
can decide to cast it or to reveal the random coins to verify that it encrypts his option, and then generate
another ciphertext. The voter can order the computer to reveal the random coins for the ciphertexts as
many times as he wants, verifying that the machine is not cheating. A corrupted computer would need to
encrypt his option m for all ciphertexts until it predicts that the voter is going to decide to cast his vote,
and then encrypt mÕ. Even if this might be mathematically satisfactory it is less convincing for the voter.
The main argument against challenge or cast is that randomness should be consider a resource, and is a
bad idea to rely on the voter as a random source. Besides being theoretically secure a scheme needs to
seem secure, and it might be less convincing for the voter to verify all the encryptions except the one that
really counts.
Other proposals try to build a challenge and cast scheme. A naive approximation would be an Interactive
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (IZKPoK). The voter is convinced as he has been interacting with
his computer, but the proof would mean nothing to a third party, as it could be simulated. However this
does not prevent coercion, as a corruptor could force the voter to answer with a hash of the commitment,
making the IZKPoK into a NIZKPoK, and then handling it to him, proving his voting option.
3.2 Our proposal for a coercion resistant cast as intended proof
We present here how to build a coercion resistant cast as intended proof, following the general proposal
given by Guasch in [GC16].
We specifically want an or-proof of two things, either a ciphertext contains a given message or the
proof has been constructed by the voter.
ZK-proof
Ë
w
--- (w witness of (u, v) being an encryption of m) ‚ (w witness of P being id) È
That is, it proves that either a given ciphertext encrypts a particular message or the prover is a particular
entity id, that will be the voter. If his personal computer produces a proof like this the voter knows that the
computer is not him, and is convinced that the ciphertext is an encryption of his selected option. However
if the voter handles this proof to a third party it would be useless, as it does not prove anything relevant
to the corrupter.
In practice this is achieved with a special kind of proof that can be simulated knowing a secret key. This
secret key is given to the voter but is not introduced into his personal computer. When the computer makes
the proof for option m the prover is convinced that his vote (u, v) encrypts m. Then he can introduce the
secret key and generate a fake proof of (u, v) being an encryption of mÕ, to show to any possible corruptor.
To have this kind of property we have to introduce the concept of chameleon hashes:
31
Fully post-quantum protocols for electronic voting
Definition 3.1 (Chameleon Hash [KR97]). cham-hash
A chameleon hash function is associated to a user id who has published a hashing public key HKid
and holds the corresponding secret key CKid. The public HKid defines a function cham-hashid (·, ·), that
can be e ciently computed knowing HKid. Taking as input a message m and a random element r this
function generates a hash value cham-hashid (m, r) satisfying the following properties:
• Collision resistance: there exists no PPT algorithm on input HKid able to find pairs (m1, r1),
(m2, r2) with m1 ”= m2 such that cham-hashid (m1, r1) = cham-hashid (m2, r2), except with a
negligible probability.
• Trapdoor collisions: there exists an e cient algorithm that takes as input the secret key CKid, any
pair (m1, r1) and an additional message m2, and finds an element r2 such that cham-hashid (m1, r1)
= cham-hashid (m2, r2).
Krawczyk and Rabin show in [KR97] a generic construction for chameleon hash functions, using a
particular pair of trapdoor permutations, and more e cient constructions based on the hardness of factoring
and the discrete logarithm.
We propose to use a lattice based hash function [GGH11] implemented with trapdoor functions and
prove that it is a chameleon hash function whose security relies on lattice based assumptions believed to
be quantum secure.
Let A1 be a random matrix and A2 a matrix obtained as in section 2.4.5, for which the SIS problem
can be e ciently solvable with the secret key. D and R are sets of small vectors of the corresponding size.
Consider the following function:
A = (A1|A2) œ Zn◊mq ,A1 œ Zn◊wq ,A2 œ Zn◊(m≠w)q , x œ Zwq , r œ Zm≠wq
fA : D ◊ R µ Zwq ◊ Zm≠wq æ Znq
(x, r) ‘æ A(x||r|)|
fA(x, r) =
1
A1A2
2Ax
r
B
= A1x + A2r = y
Theorem 3.2. The above function is a chameleon hash function if r is chosen from R following a discrete
gaussian distribution and the SIS problem can not be e ciently solved.
Chameleon Hash. Let A = (A1|A2).
• Collision resistance:
x, r , x Õ, r Õ Ω A s.t. fA(x, r) = fA(x Õ, r Õ), x, x Õ œ D, r , r Õ œ R,
=∆ A(x||r|)| = A(x Õ||r Õ|)|
=∆ A(x| ≠ x Õ||r| ≠ r Õ|)| = 0 (solve SIS)
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• Trapdoor collisions: Given x, r , x Õ using CK we find r Õ œ R such that:
A2r Õ = A1x + A2r ≠ A1x Õ
=∆ fA(x, r) = fA(x Õ, r Õ)
A2 œ Zn◊(m≠w)q is at a negligible statistical distance of a uniform distribution if (m ≠ w) ¥ 2n log q
[MP12]. This can be reduced even more if we only ask computational indistinguishability, getting a worse
backdoor quality.
In order to prove that a ciphertext contains a vote for a particular candidate z the machine has to
prove knowledge of a solution to the ISIS problem described by eq. (6). In order to do this it uses the
proof proposed by Ling et al. that we have seen in section 2.4.6. To achieve enough soundness it has to
be repeated t times, so it computes t commitments and stores them in a vector c.
Then we use as a hash the following function H2(cham-hashA(H1(c), r)). H1 is a hash function
that sends t-tuples of commitments to small vectors in Zwq , r is a random small vector chosen from
a discrete gaussian distribution, cham-hashA is a chameleon hash function from Zmq to Znq given by
cham-hashA(x, r) = (A1|A2)
A
x
r
B
= A1x+A2r = y , and H2 is another hash function that sends vectors
from Znq to the space of challenges d œ {1, 2, 3}t .
Using those challenges it computes the answers e and shows the transcription with the random element
r to the voter. The voter is convinced if the transcription is valid and the challenges are indeed this chain
of hashes using the random small element r .
He can simulate any proof choosing at random a vector h $Ω≠ Znq. Then applying the second hash obtains
d Õ = H2(h) and uses it to simulate t proofs (c Õ, d Õ, eÕ). As he knows the chameleon hash backdoor he can
compute r Õ so that h is a chameleon hash of H1(c Õ). This way d Õ = H2(h) = H2((cham-hashA(H1(c Õ), r Õ))
and the proof will be valid.
Observation 3.3. In the end the voter should have access to the secret trapdoor, for which he would
need another device, that could be a mobile phone, a cryptographic card, another computer, etc. Security
comes from both devices not being corrupted at the same time, as only a coalition of corrupted devices
could produce all fake proofs.
This scheme can be slightly adapted to make it universally verifiable, that is, not only the voter but
anyone is able to verify the coercion resistant cast as intended proof. If there is a limited number of
candidates then each voter could have a di erent hash functions for each of the candidates. During the
voting process the voter reveals to its computer the secret hash keys for all the candidates except the one
he has voted. Then, the computer is able to generate proofs of the ciphertext being an encryption of all
the possible voting options (all but one will be simulated) and publishes them on the bulletin board. No
information is revealed as all proofs are indistinguishable and everybody can check that, if the voter has
not revealed the secret information for his option, then the vote has been casted as intended.
In order to reduce the communication cost a Merkle tree structure can be used. Each user only needs
to keep a unique 256 bits seed s. It can be split into two parts of 128 bits, and then with an extendable
output function (XOF) transform each part into a 256 bits seed again, obtaining s0 and s1. This process
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can be repeated as many times as needed, following a tree structure until we have as many leaves as voting
options. From each of those seeds on the leaves an extendable output function can be used to generate
the secret key of the chameleon hash function.
In fig. 1 example we assume 8 voting options labeled in binary from 000 to 111 and suppose we want
to vote for option 011. Then, to communicate all secret keys except the one corresponding to 011 we only
need to send s00, s010 and s1, from which we can compute all the missing leaves except s011. With this
the communication cost is logarithmic in the size of voting options, that is a small number in most of the
cases.
s
s 0
s 00
s 000 s 001
s 01
s 010 s 011
s 1
s 10
s 100 s 101
s 11
s 110 s 111
Figure 1: Merkle tree example
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4. Mixing process
In an analogy with a traditional election, encrypting the votes is equivalent to introducing the ballots into
envelopes, as this guarantees that nobody can see what is inside until they are opened (decrypted). Despite
that, all envelopes are equal and indistinguishable, and it is easy to shu e votes. In an electronic election
encrypted votes are unique, linked to the person that casted them, and they can not be directly decrypted.
There are two main alternatives to deal with this problem. If the election is simple enough (the final
result is the sum of all the votes) one option for tally voting consists on using a homomorphic encryption
scheme and adding up all encryptions. Then, only the final result is decrypted.
However this does not work with the encryption scheme we have selected, even if it can be adapted to
encode messages in r -ary instead of binary multiplying the message by %qr ( instead of %q2 (. If there are N
voters, to avoid decryption error the accumulated error terms should have norm smaller than % q2N (, but,
if ciphertexts are directly summed up the errors can grow up to a factor N. This means we should have
a quadratic margin on the number of voters, that would imply a larger q and hence larger ciphertexts.
Another inconvenient is that it requires that options can be encoded as something that can be summed to
obtain the final result. This is not possible for complex election systems where the result is obtained from
the votes and some rules, for example if voters can delegate their votes, choose di erent preferences or
any other possibility. Usually we also encode the votes with some error correcting code before encrypting
them, so that we can minimize even more the possibility of a decoding error, and this code might not be
homomorphic.
The other alternative are mixing networks (mix-nets), a much more flexible approach. A mix-net
consists of several nodes that permute and re-encrypt the ciphertexts. If at least one mix-node is honest
and does not reveal its permutation then re-encryption means that it is not possible to relate its output to
its input, making impossible to relate the votes that are finally decrypted with the ones that were originally
received by the voting server.
ﬁ
!
u(1), v (1)
"
!
u(2), v (2)
"
!
u(3), v (3)
"
!
u(4), v (4)
"
!
uﬁ(1), vﬁ(1)
"
!
uﬁ(2), vﬁ(2)
"
!
uﬁ(3), vﬁ(3)
"
!
uﬁ(4), vﬁ(4)
"
„
„
„
„
Permutation Re-encryption
!
uÕ(1), v Õ(1)
"
!
uÕ(2), v Õ(2)
"
!
uÕ(3), v Õ(3)
"
!
uÕ(4), v Õ(4)
"
Figure 2: Mixing node
To ensure that no vote has been modified, removed or inserted, all inputs and outputs are published on
the bulletin board and each node has to proof that the output is indeed a permutation and a re-encryption
of its input. This particular operation of permuting and re-encrypting is called a shu e.
Observation 4.1. What we call a proof of a shu e only ensures that the ciphertexts from the output
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encrypt the same messages as the ciphertexts from the input, but does not guarantee that the random
re-encrypting parameters are chosen from the prescribed distributions. A malicious node could select some
pathological re-encrypting parameters that allow adversaries to know the relation between the input and
the output, and still construct the proof. A proof of a shu e does not prove privacy, it only proofs that
the node has not modify its content. The security is only achieved if at least one node correctly follows
the re-encryption algorithm and chooses its parameters from the adequate truly random distributions.
This is the expected requirement of this proof. Proving that re re-encryption has been computed
using random elements from the required distribution is harder and adds no extra security, as a malicious
mix-node could just leak the permutation.
4.1 Related work
Mix-nets were first introduced by Chaum in [Cha81]. His idea was to encrypt the messages as many
times as mixing nodes using RSA onions with random padding. Each node would decrypt the outer layer
and remove the padding, so that the output of the final node would be the plaintexts. This proposal
required a ciphertext size proportional to the number of nodes, as was pointed out by Park et al. [PIK94],
who proposed a re-encryption mix-net, where ciphertexts are re-randomized, and only decrypted at the
end. They also proposed a version where nodes partially decrypt the ciphertexts and re-randomized them.
Sako and Kilian give the first definition of universally verifiable mix-net, providing a zero-knowledge proof of
correct shu ing that can be verified by everybody [SK95]. Many proposals and improvements for e ciently
verifiable mix-nets have been presented since then, due to the work of Abe et al. [Abe98, Mas99, AH01],
Furuwaka et al. [FS01, Fur05] and Wikstro¨m et al. [Wik04, Wik05, Wik09, TW10]. Ne  et al. proposed
a verifiable shu e in [Nef01] that was improved in [Nef03] by Ne  himself and in [Gro03, GI08, BG12] by
Groth et al. Our proposal is based on this last proposal [BG12] of Bayer and Groth.
To the best of our knowledge there are very few proposals for lattice based re-encryption mix-nets.
Singh et al. [SRB14, SRB15] propose a re-encryption mix-net for lattice based cryptography, but they
do not provide any proof of shu ing. Costa et al. [CMM17] proposed the first proof of a shu e for
lattice based encryption schemes, based on the proof of Terelius and Wikstro¨m [TW10]. However they
use Pedersen commitments, which are perfectly hiding but only computationally binding under the discrete
logarithm assumption. This implies that proofs using this protocol will not leak any information in a future
with quantum computers, and are long term secure, but will not longer be usable in this future as soundness
is based on the discrete logarithm assumption. We aim to present a universally verifiable proof of a shu e
that is entirely based on post-quantum assumptions.
4.1.1 Costa, Mart´ınez and Morillo proof of a shu e
We first summarize here the proposal of Costa, Mart´ınez and Morillo [CMM17], and explain why it can not
be e ciently adapted to fully post-quantum constructions.
It follows Wikstro¨m’s idea of characterizing a permutation with its permutation matrix, commit to the
matrix and then prove in zero knowledge that the commitment is indeed a commitment to a permutation
matrix and that the output of the node is a re-randomization of the input multiplied by this matrix. The
matrix is committed by columns using Generalized Pedersen Commitments, which allows the prover to
commit to an N ◊ N matrix using N commitments, achieving a linear cost. In our case, if we commit
separately to each of the elements with Benhamouda et al. commitment scheme it would imply to use N2
commitments. Taking into account that Benhamouda et al. commitments are vectors of polynomials the
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size would be considerably large for a {0, 1}-matrix. Trying to commit to tuples of bits as coe cients of
polynomials would seem a solution, but it does not work, as then it is not possible to relate commitments
to the tuple with commitments to each of its coe cients, due to divisors of zero that make some operations
non invertible (Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í is a ring while Zq was a field). This same problem arises in some of the
required equations needed to proof soundness on the protocol. For this reason a di erent strategy must
be followed if we want to achieve post-quantum soundness and zero-knowledge.
4.1.2 Bayer and Groth proof of a shu e
Bayer and Groth proposed an e cient proof of a shu e based on a completely di erent approach. Instead
of characterizing a permutation by its permutation matrix they focus on the elements permuted, and use
that sets A = {ai}iœ1,...,N and B = {bi}iœ1,...,N are equal if the polynomials that have them as roots are
equal:
NŸ
i=1
(x ≠ ai) =
NŸ
i=1
(x ≠ bi)
Then, there exists a permutation ﬁ such that ai = bﬁ≠1(i).
It is also useful to write them as coe cients of the polynomials:
Nÿ
i=1
aix i =
Nÿ
i=1
bixﬁ(i)
To verify that two polynomials are equal one possibility is to evaluate them in a random point and see
if their evaluations are equal. To take into account and bound the probability of two di erent polynomials
having the same evaluation on a random point we use the Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Schwartz-Zippel lemma). Let p be a non-zero multivariate polynomial of degree d over Zq,
then the probability of p (x1, ... , xn) = 0, for randomly chosen x1, ... , xn $Ω≠ Zúq is at most dq≠1 .
Several di culties arise. The permutation ﬁ has to remain secret, so the prover can commit to
permuted elements, but can not open those commitments directly. Another problem comes from the
random evaluation points, as they have to be chosen by the verifier after the polynomials are fixed (otherwise
we would not be able to apply Schwartz-Zippel lemma). However P is not able to commit to an abstract
algebraic element like a polynomialqNi=1 bixﬁ(i) and then transform it into a commitment to one evaluation
of it qNi=1 bi–ﬁ(i) in a random point – chosen by V. To elude this issue the prover commits to ﬁ, sends
the commitment to the verifier and proves knowledge of an opening. Then the verifier chooses the random
element – and the prover commits to powers of it
Ó
–ﬁ(i)
ÔN
i=1
in c–ﬁ(i) (indexed by i) permuted in the order
previously fixed by ﬁ. At that point P has to prove that the commitment to ﬁ was an actual commitment
to a permutation, and that it was used to honestly build the commitments to
Ó
–ﬁ(i)
ÔN
i=1
. Therefore, when
the prover uses those commitments to construct a final commitment to qNi=1 bi–ﬁ(i) it is clear that this
construction is only defined by – and the permutation ﬁ, and the later was already fixed before – was
chosen. The prover can finally open this last commitment to qNi=1 ai–i , and prove that elements of A and
B are the same, in a di erent order.
The exact details involve more polynomials and evaluation points, and are given in section 4.2, with
some modifications, as we have adapted this part of the proof for our protocol.
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The output of each mix-net node is not only a permutation of the input, but also a re-encryption, thus
we need to introduce it on the proof. Bayer and Groth use ElGamal encryptions. They re-encrypt their
ciphertexts multiplying by an encryption of 1. The homomorphic properties of ElGamal imply that when
we combine all encryptions in the polynomial in – we can also combine all those re-encrypting parameters
into another encryption of the multiplication of all of those 1’s, which is again a 1, with the corresponding
randomization elements given by –. To combine it with the previous proof it uses a multi-exponentiation
and a product argument.
We use the fact that in our RLWE encryption scheme adding an encryption of 0 works as a re-
encryption, but it is only true if the number of re-encryptions is limited. If we consider an arbitrary linear
combination of the randomization elements the result would not have small norm, and it would not be a
valid encryption. Therefore, we have substituted this part of their argument and treated all randomization
elements separately.
4.2 Our proposal for a proof of a shu e
In this section we are going to explain how to construct a cryptographic shu e of a list of N RLWE
encryptions and also how to prove its correctness with a post-quantum cryptosystem.
When we permute and then re-randomize a vote we will use the following notation
1
uÕ(i), v Õ(i)
2
=
Re-Enc
11
uﬁ(i), vﬁ(i)
2
, r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v
2
. Following this notation with a given permutation ﬁ and a set of
re-encryption parameters
1
r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v
2
for each one of the messages, we can express the shu ing of N
RLWE encryptions as:
Qcca
uÕ(1), v Õ(1)
... ...
uÕ(N), v Õ(N)
Rddb =
Qcca
uﬁ(1), vﬁ(1)
... ...
uﬁ(N), vﬁ(N)
Rddb+
Qcca
r Õ(1)E...
r Õ(N)E
Rddb1aE, bE2+
Qcca
eÕ(1)E,u , e
Õ(1)
E,v... ...
eÕ(N)E,u , e
Õ(N)
E,v
Rddb (7)
A mix-net node should prove that it knows the permutation ﬁ and the random elements r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v
such that the output of the node
1
uÕ v Õ
2
is the input
1
u v
2
re-encrypted and permuted, without
revealing any information about ﬁ, r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u and e
Õ(i)
E,v .
ZK-proof
SWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWU
ﬁ
r Õ(1)E , ... , r
Õ(N)
E
eÕ(1)E,u , ... , e
Õ(N)
E,u
eÕ(1)E,v , ... , e
Õ(N)
E,v
-----------------------
1
uÕ(1), v Õ(1), ... , uÕ(N), v Õ(N)
2|
=Qccccca
Re-Enc
11
uﬁ(1), vﬁ(1)
2
, r Õ(1)E , e
Õ(1)
E,u , e
Õ(1)
E,v
2|
...
Re-Enc
11
uﬁ(N), vﬁ(N)
2
, r Õ(N)E , e
Õ(N)
E,u , e
Õ(N)
E,v
2|
Rdddddb
...r Õ(i)E ... , ...eÕ(i)E,u... , ...eÕ(i)E,v... Æ ”
TXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXV
We recall here that the set of mix-net nodes needs to achieve two properties, anonymity and integrity
of the votes. On the one hand if at least one of the mix-net nodes chooses its re-encryption parameters
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from the appropriate discrete gaussian distribution ‰n‡ and keeps them secret then it is not feasible for an
adversary to trace the votes back, because it will mean that it will be able to distinguish RLWE samples
from uniformly random polynomials.
On the other hand it needs to guarantee that the plaintexts of all the votes remain the same, even
if some of the nodes are dishonest and leak the permutation they are not able to modify the encrypted
plaintext. In order to do so it publishes the corresponding proofs of permutation and re-encryption. The
mix-net node should convince everybody that the votes have been permuted and then there has been added
to them something that is of the form of an encryption of 0. (u0, v0) = (aEr ÕE + eÕE,u, bEr ÕE + eÕE,v ) with
small polynomials r ÕE, eÕE,u, eÕE,v to certify that when we decrypt it we would get a 0. The way we have of
achieving this property is to prove that the infinity norm of r ÕE, eÕE,u, eÕE,v is bounded by some parameter
” << q/4.
This implies that honest nodes must choose its parameters form ‰n‡ conditioned to a norm smaller than
”. As it is explained in [BKLP15] for a suitable ” even if this additional restriction on the re-encryption
parameters norm is applied, the RLWE re-encryptions remain pseudorandom, as the two probability distri-
butions are statistically close.
Following the strategy used by Bayer and Groth in [BG12] we prove that two sets contain the same
elements committing to two polynomials, each of them having as roots the elements from each set, and
then prove that both polynomials are equal. To prove with overwhelming probability that two polynomials
are equal it evaluates them and uses the Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
In our case the elements will be polynomials. We want to prove:
Ó1
uÕ(i), v Õ(i)
2
≠
1
ar Õ(i)E + e
Õ(i)
E,u , br
Õ(i)
E + e
Õ(i)
E,v
2ÔN
i=1
=
Ó1
u(i), v (i)
2ÔN
i=1
µ Rq ◊ Rq (8)
Our polynomials have coe cients in Rq, that is, we will work in Rq [A]. If we have an equality as
polynomials:
Nÿ
i=1
Aiu(i) =
Nÿ
i=1
Aﬁ(i)
1
uÕ(i) ≠ ar Õ(i)E + eÕ(i)E,u
2
Nÿ
i=1
Aiv (i) =
Nÿ
i=1
Aﬁ(i)
1
v Õ(i) ≠ br Õ(i)E + eÕ(i)E,v
2
Then we should also have an equality when evaluating in a randomly chosen – œ Rq:
Nÿ
i=1
–iu(i) =
Nÿ
i=1
–ﬁ(i)
1
uÕ(i) ≠ ar Õ(i)E + eÕ(i)E,u
2
(9)
Nÿ
i=1
–iv (i) =
Nÿ
i=1
–ﬁ(i)
1
v Õ(i) ≠ br Õ(i)E + eÕ(i)E,v
2
(10)
For this to imply that over the choice of – the coe cients have overwhelming probability of being equal
we will need a generalized version of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma that works in general commutative rings
as Rq, that are not necessarily integral domains. This is lemma 4.3. It is also important to notice that all
this equalities will be shown commited. As was first introduced in section 4.1.2 we will need to commit to
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–ﬁ(i) for a permutation ﬁ fixed before the verifier chooses the element – (for the lemma to be useful we
need the polynomials in Rq [A] to be determined before the evaluation point is fixed).
Lemma 4.3 (Generalized Schwartz-Zippel lemma). Let P œ R [x1, x2, ... , xn] be a non-zero polynomial of
total degree d Ø 0 over a commutative ring R. Let S be a finite subset of R such that:
’s, t œ S : ((÷u œ R : (u ”= 0 · su = tu)) =∆ s = t)
and let r1, r2, ... , rn be selected at random independently and uniformly from S.
Then Pr [P(r1, r2, ... , rn) = 0] Æ d|S| .
Proof. The condition imposed on S implies that a nonzero degree d univariate polynomial f œ R[x ] can
only have d roots in S. We can prove this by induction.
Case d = 0 is trivially true.
Assume the inequality holds for polynomials of degree smaller or equal to d and let f (x) be a polynomial
of degree d + 1 with d + 2 di erent roots a1, a2, ... , ad+2 œ S. The polynomial reminder theorem implies
that we can write f (x) = (x ≠ ad+2)g(x) for some polynomial g(x) of degree d .
In a field, a1, a2, ... , ad+1 being roots of f (x) and not of (x ≠ ad+2) would imply that they are roots of
g(x). But we are working with a polynomial ring, that may not be an integral domain, and this may not
always be true.
However as a1, ... , ad+1 belong to S we can prove by contradiction that they are all roots of g(x).
Assume that (ai ≠ ad+2)g(ai) = 0 with g(ai) ”= 0, we have the condition of the lemma hypothesis.
g(ai) ”= 0 · aig(ai) = ad+2g(ai). As both ai , ad+2 œ S we have that ai = ad+2, contradicting the
hypothesis of the roots being di erent.
Therefore we have that g(ai) = 0, and this is valid for all i œ 1, ... , d + 1. Then g(x) would have
d + 1 di erent roots in S, this time contradicting the induction hypothesis and proving the result for the
univariate case.
In order to prove the multivariate case we can follow the standard proof of the Schwartz–Zippel lemma,
by induction on n.
Case n = 1 is the univariate case that we have already proved.
Assume the lemma is true for polynomials of n or less variables. We can write an (n + 1)-variate
polynomial as:
f (x1, ... , xn+1) =
ÿ
iÆd Õ
x in+1fi(x1, ... , xn)
Where fd Õ is nonzero. As an n-variate polynomial, by the induction hypothesis, we have:
Pr
Ë
fd Õ(x1, ... , xn) = 0
È
Æ deg(fd Õ)|S|
If fd Õ(a1, ... , an) ”= 0, by the base case of the induction hypothesis we have:
Pr
Ë
f (a1, ... , an, xn+1) = 0
È
Æ d
Õ
|S|
And finally:
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Pr
Ë
f (a1, ... , an, an+1) = 0
È
= Pr
Ë
f (a1, ... , an, an+1) = 0 · fd Õ(a1, ... , an) = 0
È
+ Pr
Ë
f (a1, ... , an, an+1) = 0 · fd Õ(a1, ... , an) ”= 0
È
Æ Pr
Ë
fd Õ(a1, ... , an) = 0
È
+ Pr
Ë
f (a1, ... , an, an+1) = 0
---fd Õ(a1, ... , an) ”= 0È
Æ deg(fd Õ)|S| +
d Õ
|S|
Æ d|S|
Now we need to define a suitable subset S ™ Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í for which the condition holds. If we
rewrite:
if there is an u ”= 0 such that (s ≠ t)u = 0 it must be because s = t
in terms of its contrapositive we get:
the di erence s ≠ t of any two di erent elements in S is not a divisor of 0
We can guarantee it if all di erences of elements in S are invertible. We choose:
S =
Ó
p(x) œ Zq [x ] / Èxn + 1Í
--- deg p(x) < n/2Ô
Observe that the proposed subset S meets the required condition for lemma 4.3, as all di erences of
two polynomials in S have degree smaller than n/2, and q © 3 mod 8 required for section 2.4.4 implies
that they are invertible. The number of elements in S is still exponential in n, so we can use it as a set of
challenges.
Once that we have solved the problem of working on a ring instead of a field we can start building a
proof for eqs. (9) and (10). The prover P starts choosing a random permutation ﬁ $Ω≠ SN and following
Bayer and Groth he starts building commitments cﬁ(1), ... , cﬁ(N) (cﬁ(i) is indexed by i and not by the value
of ﬁ (i)) to ﬁ (1) , ... ,ﬁ (N), using the commitment scheme described in section 2.4.4.
The prover sends those commitments to the verifier and he replies with a random polynomial – $Ω≠ S.
P commits to each power –ﬁ(i) in commitments c–ﬁ(i) (again indexed by i).
However the verifier still does not know what is contained in those commitments. We can temporarily
call mi to the message committed in cﬁ(i), and ‚mi to the message committed in c–ﬁ(i) . The prover needs
to convince the verifier that they are commitments to a permutation and to powers of – permuted by the
same permutation.
To do so V chooses two more random polynomials —, “ $Ω≠ S. Using the ⌃-proofs that allow us to
prove linear relations P proves that he knows openings mi , ‚mi to commitments cﬁ(i), c–ﬁ(i) that satisfy the
following relation:
NŸ
i=1
1
—i + –i ≠ “
2
=
NŸ
i=1
(—mi + ‚mi ≠ “) (11)
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We can consider the two expressions as polynomials in Rq [G ] evaluated in “. The left hand side of the
equation has been determined by the choices of the verifier, and for the right hand side, by the binding
property of the commitment scheme we know that mi , ‚mi were determined before the choice for “ was
made. The prover has shown that they are equal when evaluated in the specific “ œ S chosen by the verifier,
so we can apply the generalized Schwartz-Zippel lemma 4.3 and say that with overwhelming probability
both polynomials defined by eq. (11) are equal in Rq [ ] and have the same roots. These roots may be in
di erent order, defined by a permutation Âﬁ. For all i œ 1, ... ,N we have:
—mi + ‚mi = —Âﬁ(i) + –Âﬁ(i), ’i œ 1, ... ,N
We can rewrite it as an equation on —:
—(mi ≠ Âﬁ(i)) = –Âﬁ(i) ≠ ‚mi , ’i œ 1, ... ,N
The polynomialsmi and ‚mi where fixed before — was chosen. But we still do not know if the permutationÂﬁ was predetermined. However, looking at one i and fixedmi and ‚mi we can consider all possible j œ 1, ... ,N
and study —(mi ≠ j) = –j ≠ ‚mi . If (mi ≠ j) ”= 0 then there exists at most one —j œ S that fulfills the
equation with j (this was trivial in Bayer and Groth’s proof, but in our case is again given by the condition
of set S). The probability of choosing — equal to one of these (at most N) —j is negligible. This implies
that for each i there exists a j such that mi = j and therefore ‚mi = –j . With this reasoning for each i and
the previous equations we finally get that, with overwhelming probability mi = Âﬁ(i) and ‚mi = –Âﬁ(i).
This means that c–ﬁ(i) are indeed commitments to – with exponents from 1 to N permuted in an order
that was fixed by cﬁ(i) before – was chosen. Combining them with commitments to encryptions of 0 (this
will be discussed later) we can build a ZK-proof involving the input and output of the mix-net node in the
following polynomial relation:
Nÿ
i=1
–iu(i) =
Nÿ
i=1
–ﬁ(i)
1
uÕ(i) ≠ ar Õ(i)E ≠ eÕ(i)E,u
2
(12)
Once again and for the last time we can see it as polynomials with coe cients in Rq and variable A
that are equal when evaluated in –. If both polynomials were determined before – was picked up we can
apply lemma 4.3 and conclude that with overwhelming probability they are equal as polynomials, and so:
uÕ(i) = uﬁ(i) + ar Õ(i)E + e
Õ(i)
E,u
And the same reasoning would apply to the v Õ(i).
v Õ(i) = vﬁ(i) + br Õ(i)E + e
Õ(i)
E,v
The only remaining step, that could be executed before the election in an o ine phase, is to prove that
the ciphertexts that we add up are valid encryptions of 0. Random elements r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v for i œ 1, ... ,N
are required to have coe cients belonging to [≠” + 1, ” ≠ 1]. Those encryptions of 0 will be committed,
and our real goal would be to prove in zero-knowledge that some polynomials are valid commitments to
valid encryptions of 0. That is, that the pair of elements:
3
cu(i)0 , cv (i)0
4
=
1
aC
1
aEr Õ(i)E + e
Õ(i)
E,u
2
+ bCr (i)C,u + e
(i)
C,u, aC
1
bEr Õ(i)E + e
Õ(i)
E,v
2
+ bCr (i)C,v + e
(i)
C,v
2
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Is such that r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v , e
(i)
C,u, e
(i)
C,v have small norm (r
(i)
C,u, r
(i)
C,v can be any polynomial in Rq).
In order to prove this we are going to use the strategy proposed by del Pino and Lyubashebsky [dPL17].
We can write this as a linear function:
f
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(i)
C,v
2
We want to prove that we know preimages of this function that satisfy some conditions, related to the
norm of the preimages. Using the proposed method of [dPL17] we can take advantage of the fact that
we need to prove knowledge preimages of the same function for all i œ 1, ... ,N and amortize the cost.
Inside the proof we have to check di erent conditions for (r Õ(i)E , e
Õ(i)
E,u , e
Õ(i)
E,v ) and (e
(i)
C,u, e
(i)
C,u). This is not a
problem, as we just need to treat them separately, computing di erent masking parameters and adjusting
the probability of an abortion, and directly applying [dPL17] for each part.
4.2.1 Proof of a shu e protocol
Combining all this parts in the proper order we can define our proposal for a lattice based proof of a shu e,
described in protocol 5.
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Protocol 5: Mixnet protocol
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4.2.2 Completeness, Zero-Knowledge and Soundness
If the prover P choses all re-encryption parameters from the appropriate distributions ‰‡ conditioned to
have norm smaller than ”, correctly builds the commitments to the encryptions of 0 and follows the small
secrets proof the answer will be accepted. This is also the case for the proof of the committed permuted
powers of –, as products rNi=1 !—i + –i ≠ “" and rNi=1 (—mi + ‚mi ≠ “) are exactly equal, just in permuted
order. Finally the two last ZK-proofs are accepted as the output is exactly a permutation and re-encryption
of the input, and we have built a polynomial subtracting the re-encryptions and inverting the permutation,
therefore it is also accepted. To summarize, the protocol is accepted as all the ZK-proofs involved are
accepted if an honest prover follows the protocols, so it is complete.
All information published consists of computationally hiding commitments and ZK-proof conversations
that can be simulated, which implies that the whole protocol is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
Soundness comes from the generalized Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the binding property of Benhamouda
et al. commitments and the soundness of each of the ZK-proofs.
We start with the first ZK-proof.
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2
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the extractor of this zero-knowledge proof given by Del Pino and
Lyubashebsky provides us with valid openings of cu(i)0 and cv (i)0 to a valid encryption of 0. Then, we analyze
the next zero-knowledge proof.
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This time, using the extractor of Benhamouda et al. we obtain valid openings for cﬁ(i) and c–ﬁ(i) that
satisfy the equation rNi=1 !—i + –i ≠ “" = rNi=1 (—mi + ‚mi ≠ “). The order in which all polynomials have
been determined, generalized Schwartz-Zippel and the previously discussed argument guarantees that, with
overwhelming probability those extracted messages are permuted integers from 1 to N and powers of – in
the same order. Finally we have the last two zero-knowledge proofs.
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Using the extractor of these proofs we obtain openings of cﬁ(i), c–ﬁ(i) , cu(i)0 , cv (i)0 . Given that the com-
mitment scheme is binding we know from previous proofs that those openings are ﬁ (i) ,–ﬁ(i), u(i)0 , v
(i)
0 .
Then, the relations hold by the messages committed that were written in terms of my are exactly:
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2
Applying for the last time the generalized Schwartz-Zippel lemma we can ensure with overwhelming
probability that:
’i œ 1, ... ,N
u(i) = uÕﬁ≠1(i) ≠ uﬁ≠1(i)0
v (i) = v Õﬁ≠1(i) ≠ vﬁ≠1(i)0
And it implies that the mix-net node has performed a correct shu e on the input votes.
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5. Conclusions
While quantum computers are a big threat to classical cryptography, post-quantum cryptographic primitives
are experiencing a boost of publications in the recent years. Post-quantum alternatives may soon be mature
enough to replace them, and lattice based cryptography is the most promising alternative for public key
encryption schemes. It is of paramount importance to start basing our communications on post-quantum
assumptions, in order to prevent future attacks on todays data and to have solid cryptographic constructions
ready.
In this thesis we have presented two protocols necessary to build an electronic voting scheme. The first
one is a direct application of existing lattice based constructions, and allows a voter to check that his vote
has been casted correctly. Then a proof of a shu e is derived from existing protocols, in this case not being
a direct translation as many modifications have been needed to adapt it to lattice based requirements.
In order to define a complete voting scheme they have to be combined with other protocols for di erent
requirements, for example a key exchange mechanism for threshold decryption, a way of signing the votes
that allows the voting server to recognize that it has been casted by an authorized voter, a proof of validity
that ensures that a casted vote is a valid vote and a mechanism that prevents other voters from casting
the same vote (or a modification of the vote) of another user. These protocols (that might be combined)
have to be specifically defined, and are left for future work.
Our proposal for a proof of a shu e has size linear in the number of votes. A real implementation
taking advantage of all possible optimizations (FFT and e cient discrete gauss sampling) would be needed
to see how well does it compare with non post-quantum proposals. Another future line of work would be
to improve the e ciency of some of the constructions. The amortized proof of knowledge of small secrets
seems to be the one with more possible improvements, as many papers with incremental improvements
have been proposed recently regarding this subject. On the other hand, the proof of Ling et al. derives from
a code based proof by Stern, and several improvements have been made recently on the code framework
[AGS11], that are worth studying in case those improvements have a translation on the lattice framework.
While it has been developed for several years post-quantum cryptography is still a very recent area, for
which there is a lot of work to do.
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